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I. INTRODUCTION
Our litigation system is based upon the assumption that standards 
of proof matter.1 They serve “to instruct the factfinder concerning the 
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correct-
ness of factual conclusions.”2 The various standards of proof reflect 
the legal system’s judgment about the proper allocation of risk be-
tween litigants, as well as the relative importance of the issues at 
stake.3 For example, in criminal cases where the defendant’s liberty 
may be at stake, the prosecution carries the burden of proving every 
element of the criminal charge “beyond a reasonable doubt.”4 In con-
trast, “preponderance of the evidence,” a much less stringent standard, 
is most common in civil cases.5 The third main standard, “clear and 
convincing evidence,” is an intermediate standard employed in civil 
litigation when “the individual interests at stake . . . are both ‘particu-
larly important’ and ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’”6
But despite the perceived importance of standards of proof, few 
empirical studies have tested lay jurors’ understanding and application 
of standards of proof, particularly in civil litigation.7 Specifically, to 
our knowledge, there has not been a large-scale study of a demo-
graphically representative population comparing jurors’ decisions 
when confronted with the two standards of proof used in civil litiga-
tion: (1) preponderance of the evidence, and (2) clear and convincing 
evidence.8
Patent law recently presented an opportunity to assess the impact 
of varying the standard of proof in civil litigation. Under Section 282 
                                                                                                                  
1. See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An 
Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 413 (1997) (“Burden of proof rules . . . are 
central to the adversary system.”); Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 YALE L.J. 738, 741 
(2012) (“Systems of adjudication base outcomes on whether the strength of available evi-
dence satisfies a designated burden of proof.”). 
2. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
3. See infra Part II.B (explaining in more detail the role of standards of proof). 
4. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361 (“[B]eyond a reasonable doubt . . . is now accepted in 
common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must 
convince the trier of all the essential elements of guilt.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000). 
5. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979); see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 
U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (“Because the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard results in a 
roughly equal allocation of the risk of error between litigants, we presume that this standard 
is applicable in civil actions between private litigants unless particularly important individu-
al interests or rights are at stake.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
6. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424). 
7. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 424–25 (noting that there are “no directly relevant empiri-
cal studies” regarding “what lay jurors understand concerning the differences among these 
three [standards] or the nuances of a judge’s instructions on the law”); Kaplow, supra note 
1, at 809 (“The question of what probability factfinders actually associate with, say, the 
preponderance of the evidence rule — and how that minimum required probability varies by 
context — is an empirical one. Furthermore, it is one about which little is known.”). 
8. See infra Part II.C. 
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of the Patent Act, every claim in a patent issued by the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) is presumed to be valid.9 This 
same statute also provides that “[t]he burden of establishing invalidity 
of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such 
invalidity.”10 However, the statute fails to specify the standard of 
proof necessary to overcome this presumption of validity. 
In a recent case, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership (“i4i”),
the U.S. Supreme Court heard competing arguments regarding the 
proper standard of proof for finding a patent invalid.11 Microsoft ar-
gued that the preponderance of the evidence standard should apply, at 
least when the USPTO had not considered the prior art that allegedly 
invalidated the patent.12 But the Court unanimously affirmed the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (“Federal Circuit”) 
longstanding interpretation that invalidity must be proven “by clear 
and convincing evidence.”13
However, the Court also held that if the party challenging a pa-
tent’s validity could introduce new evidence in litigation that had not 
previously been considered by the USPTO during the patent’s exami-
nation, then “the challenger’s burden to persuade the jury of its inva-
lidity defense by clear and convincing evidence may be easier to sus-
sustain.”14 In such situations, the jury should be instructed that “it has 
heard evidence that the [US]PTO had no opportunity to evaluate be-
fore granting the patent” and to “consider that fact when determining 
whether an invalidity defense has been proved by clear and convinc-
ing evidence.”15 But at the same time, the Court declined “to endorse 
any particular formulation” for such an instruction.16
Both the parties in i4i and the Court apparently assumed that the 
standard of proof would affect lay jurors’ decisions regarding invalidi-
ty, at least on the margins.17 In i4i’s wake, we tested this assumption 
by conducting an experiment involving the validity of a hypothetical 
                                                                                                                  
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. Each 
claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other 
claims . . . . ”). 
10. Id.
11. 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
12. Id. at 2244, 2249. 
13. Id. at 2243, 2252; see also Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 
1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“[Section] 282 creates a presumption that a patent is valid and 
imposes the burden of proving invalidity on the attacker. That burden is constant and never 
changes and is to convince the court of invalidity by clear evidence.”). 
14. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2251. 
15. Id.
16. Id.
17.  Cf. Brief of Apple Inc. and Intel Corp. as Amici Curiae Supporting Reversal at 15, 
i4i, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290) (arguing that parties in patent litigation frequently 
believe “[t]he evidentiary standard has a compelling effect on jurors . . . . and it often is 
dispositive of the verdict” in patent validity challenges, particularly “in cases involving 
weak patents”). 
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patent. In our experiment, each subject received a short fact pattern 
simulating the information considered by a juror in a patent infringe-
ment lawsuit.18 In this fact pattern, a key piece of prior art introduced 
at trial by the party challenging the patent’s validity had not been con-
sidered by the USPTO. After reading the fact pattern and a summary 
of the parties’ arguments, each subject received a randomly assigned 
jury instruction regarding the standard of proof for establishing inva-
lidity: (1) clear and convincing evidence, (2) clear and convincing 
evidence with an i4i-type instruction regarding the new evidence not 
considered by the USPTO, and (3) preponderance of the evidence. 
Our results suggest that i4i’s impact — and the role of burdens of 
proof in civil litigation more generally — may be more complex than 
is generally assumed. Following conventional wisdom, we anticipated 
that a clear and convincing evidence standard with an i4i-type instruc-
tion would result in an intermediate burden between clear and con-
vincing evidence (highest burden) and preponderance of the evidence 
(lowest burden), and that the subjects’ decisions regarding the invalid-
ity challenge would reflect these differences.19 This expectation was 
partially supported by our experiment. Subjects who received the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard found the patent invalid more 
often than those who received the clear and convincing evidence 
standard.20 Similarly, subjects who received a clear and convincing 
evidence standard with an i4i-type instruction (intermediate burden) 
found the patent invalid more often than those who received the plain 
clear and convincing evidence standard (i.e., without an i4i-type in-
struction).21 Both of these differences were statistically significant.22
Subjects who received the clear and convincing standard with an 
i4i-type instruction (intermediate burden) unexpectedly found the pa-
tent invalid at rates statistically indistinguishable from those who re-
ceived the lower preponderance of the evidence standard.23 As 
discussed in more detail below, this finding may have important rami-
fications for invalidity challenges in patent litigation. It appears that 
the addition of an i4i-type instruction to the clear and convincing 
standard may effectively result in a standard of proof that, at least in 
jurors’ views, is equivalent to the preponderance standard explicitly 
rejected by the Court in i4i.24 This surprising result suggests that Mi-
crosoft may have actually achieved its desired outcome in i4i by mak-
                                                                                                                  
18. See infra Part IV for an explanation of the study’s methodology. The entire fact pat-
tern and jury instructions given to subjects are reproduced infra Appendix A. 
19. See infra pp. 19–20 for the specific hypotheses tested in our experiment. 
20. See infra Part V.A. 
21. See infra Part V.A. 
22. See infra Part V.A. 
23. See infra Part V.A. 
24. See infra Part V.B. 
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ing it easier for juries to invalidate questionable patents, even though 
Microsoft lost the case. 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of burdens of proof in 
litigation. It also analyzes the handful of existing empirical studies 
regarding the standard of proof. Part III summarizes the development 
of the presumption of validity in patent law, including the Supreme 
Court’s decision in i4i. Part IV explains the methodology and experi-
mental design employed in our experimental study. Part V recounts 
and analyzes the study’s results, and then it concludes with some im-
plications and potential directions for future research in this area. 
II. STANDARDS OF PROOF — AN OVERVIEW
First, this Part distinguishes the standard of proof, which is the 
degree of certainty required for a jury or judge to find for a party on 
an issue, from the broader “burden of proof.” Second, it explains the 
purposes of standards of proof in litigation and the three main stand-
ards that are used. Third, it summarizes the literature on previous em-
pirical studies regarding standards of proof. 
A. The Burden of Proof 
The burden of proof, described as one of “the slipperiest mem-
ber[s] of the family of legal terms,”25 has “vexed [both] courts and 
commentators for decades.”26 This is at least partially because the 
burden of proof encompasses several different components, but courts 
and litigants have not always taken care to distinguish between 
them.27
First, it can mean the “burden of production.” Initially described 
by James Bradley Thayer in his famous treatise on evidence,28 the 
burden of production identifies which party must offer evidence in 
                                                                                                                  
25. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (alteration in original) (quoting 2 J.
STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 342, at 433 (5th ed. 1999)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE:
PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 3.1, at 159 (2d ed. 1999) (stating that the burden of proof “is 
among the most slippery in the larger areas of procedure and evidence”).
26. Nelson v. Hughes, 625 P.2d 643, 645 (Or. 1981). 
27. See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collier-
ies, 512 U.S. 267, 272 (1994) (explaining that “[f]or many years the term ‘burden of proof’ 
was ambiguous because the term was used to describe two distinct concepts” — the “burden 
of persuasion” and the “burden of production”); United States v. Hollis, 569 F.2d 199, 204 
n.6 (3d Cir. 1977) (“The meaning of the phrase, burden of proof, has been clouded by an 
unfortunate confusion of terminology . . . . ” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
28. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, 1 A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE 
COMMON LAW 355 (1898) (describing this burden as “the duty of going forward in argu-
ment or in producing evidence[,] whether at the beginning of a case or at any later moment 
throughout the trial”). 
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order to raise an issue in litigation.29 In other words, “[t]he burden of 
production is the obligation to make a prima facie case.”30 This bur-
den is relatively light; it is satisfied when a litigant has “produce[d] 
sufficient evidence so that a rational jury or other factfinder could find 
that each of the elements of the claim has been proven.”31
Second, the burden of proof can mean the “burden of persua-
sion” — i.e., the ultimate obligation on a party to persuade the deci-
sion maker that the party should prevail on a contested issue.32 The 
latter concept was famously explained by John Henry Wigmore as the 
“risk of nonpersuasion.”33 In civil litigation, the burden of persuasion 
for all elements of a claim typically rests with the plaintiff, while the 
defendant has the burden of persuasion for most affirmative defens-
es.34
Third, the burden of proof has been used to mean the “standard of 
proof.”35 This concept “refers to the quantum of proof required to sus-
tain the burden of persuasion.”36 In i4i, the Supreme Court explained 
the “standard of proof” as: 
[T]he degree of certainty by which the factfinder 
must be persuaded . . . to find in favor of the party 
bearing the burden of persuasion. In other words, the 
term “standard of proof” specifies how difficult it 
will be for the party bearing the burden of persuasion 
to convince the jury of the facts in its favor.37
In this Article, we are concerned exclusively with the standard of 
proof, as opposed to the other aspects of the burden of proof. 
                                                                                                                  
29. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 49; see also Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution,
59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 521 (2006) (“The burden of production requires a party to properly 
raise an issue to put that issue into play.”). 
30. 31A C.J.S. EVIDENCE § 189 (2012). 
31. 29 AM. JUR. 2D EVIDENCE § 181 (2012); see also St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 
U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (holding the burden of production is satisfied in the employment dis-
crimination context when the plaintiff establishes “by a preponderance of the evidence, a 
‘prima facie’ case”). 
32. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245 n.4 (2011) (using the 
 term “burden of persuasion” to “identify the party who must persuade the jury in its  
favor to prevail”). 
33. See Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collier-
ies, 512 U.S. 267, 282 (citing 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1981)); 
see also Fleming James, Jr., Burdens of Proof, 47 VA. L. REV. 51, 51 (1961). 
34. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 57. 
35. Some have classified the “standard of proof” (along with the risk of nonpersuasion) 
as part of the “burden of persuasion.” See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Presumptions and 
Transcendentalism: You Prove It! Why Should I?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 691 
(1994) (“The burden of persuasion has two components, the risk of nonpersuasion and the 
standard of proof.”). 
36. Metzger, supra note 29, at 521. 
37. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2245 n.4 (citation omitted). 
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B. The Role and Types of Standards of Proof 
The standard of proof serves multiple purposes. First, it deter-
mines how to allocate the risk of error between litigants.38 In litiga-
tion, there is always some risk the decision maker will reach an 
erroneous conclusion.39 As Justice Harlan explained in In re Winship,
“in a judicial proceeding in which there is a dispute about the facts of 
some earlier event, the factfinder cannot acquire unassailably accurate 
knowledge of what happened. Instead, all the factfinder can acquire is 
a belief of what probably happened.”40 The standard of proof thus 
attempts to balance the risk between so-called Type I errors (i.e., false 
positives), such as an erroneous finding of liability in a civil case or 
the conviction of an innocent person, and Type II errors (i.e., false 
negatives), such as the denial of a meritorious claim in a civil case or 
an erroneous acquittal of a criminal defendant.41
Second, the standard of proof is used to “indicate the relative im-
portance attached to the ultimate decision.”42 In particular, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that a heightened standard of proof — 
i.e., something greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence — 
is required when fundamental rights or important liberty interests are 
at issue.43
Because the costs of error and consequences of the outcome ob-
viously vary in different settings, three primary standards of proof 
exist at common law. From lowest to highest degree of certainty re-
quired, they are: (1) preponderance of the evidence, (2) clear and con-
vincing evidence, and (3) beyond a reasonable doubt.44
Preponderance of the evidence is the standard of proof for most 
issues in civil litigation, reflecting the legal system’s assumptions that 
the standard “results in a roughly equal allocation of the risk of error 
                                                                                                                  
38. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (explaining that 
the standard of proof “serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants” (quoting 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Kaplow, supra note 1, at 741 (“The stringency of the proof burden determines how error is 
allocated between mistakes of commission — improper assignment of liability — and mis-
takes of omission — improper exoneration.”). 
39. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (“There is always in  
litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must  
take into account.”). 
40. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
41. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 827 (8th ed. 2011); see also In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. at 370–71 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
42. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. 
43. See id. at 424 (explaining that heightened standards of proof are necessary when  
the interests at stake are “particularly important” and “more substantial than mere  
loss of money”). 
44. Id. at 423–24; see also Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof Revisited, 33 VT. L.
REV. 469, 486 (2009). 
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between litigants”45 and the costs of a “mistaken judgment for the 
plaintiff is no worse than a mistaken judgment for the defendant.”46 In 
other words, as Chief Justice Rehnquist explained, “[t]he preponder-
ance-of-the-evidence standard . . . is employed when the social disutil-
ity of error in either direction is roughly equal.”47
In contrast, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally 
required for conviction in criminal cases.48 This standard has been 
described by the Court as the “bedrock . . . principle whose ‘enforce-
ment lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal 
law.’”49 In terms of allocation of risk, the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard places almost all risk upon the government rather than the 
criminal defendant.50 In other words, it strongly prefers Type II errors 
(erroneous acquittals) instead of Type I errors (erroneous convic-
tions). This is exemplified by Blackstone’s famous formulation that 
“it is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suf-
fer.”51 The preference for Type II errors embodied in the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard is due to the severe consequences of a con-
viction — the loss of liberty as well as the stigma and collateral con-
sequences that accompany a criminal record.52
Clear and convincing evidence represents an “intermediate stand-
ard” between preponderance of the evidence and reasonable doubt.53
Although the exact terminology used to refer to this heightened stand-
ard of proof has varied over time,54 jury instructions often explain that 
                                                                                                                  
45. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); see also Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate
Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 467 
(2004) (“The preponderance of the evidence standard is thus appropriate in the civil context 
because it has little if any tendency to generate erroneous verdicts disproportionately in 
favor of plaintiffs or defendants.”).
46. 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 341, at 570 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). 
47. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 788 n.13 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
48. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1969); see also Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 
275, 278 (1993) (holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by jury requires a jury 
verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt). 
49. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 
(1895)).
50. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423–24 (1979) (“In the administration of 
criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself . . . . by re-
quiring . . . that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
51. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358–59. The 10:1 ratio articulated by 
Blackstone is contested; as Alexander Volokh has pointed out, the perceived optimal ratio 
between erroneous acquittals and erroneous convictions has varied dramatically in Anglo-
American jurisprudence. See generally Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV.
173, 182–91, 198–203 (1997). 
52. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (“The accused during a criminal prosecution has at 
stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his 
liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the 
conviction.”).
53. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424. 
54. Compare id. (explaining this standard “usually employs some combination of the 
words ‘clear,’ ‘cogent,’ ‘unequivocal’ and ‘convincing’”), with Buildex Inc. v. Kason In-
dus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Although not susceptible to precise defi-
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it is higher than a preponderance of the evidence standard, but it does 
not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt.55 Less commonly em-
ployed than the preponderance standard used for most civil issues, 
clear and convincing evidence is often required when “[t]he interests 
at stake . . . are deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of mon-
ey.”56 For example, the Court has held that clear and convincing evi-
dence is required for involuntary civil commitment due to mental 
illness,57 deportation for violation of immigration law,58 and the ter-
mination of parental rights.59 In patent law, a variety of issues must be 
proven by clear and convincing evidence, including willful infringe-
ment,60 inequitable conduct,61 correction of inventorship,62 and over-
coming the presumption of priority in an interference proceeding with 
an issued patent.63
C. Previous Empirical Studies 
1. Survey Evidence 
Several previous studies have attempted to empirically measure 
standards of proof by asking potential decision makers to assign per-
centage probabilities to the various standards. 
In the early 1970s, Rita James Simon and Linda Mahan asked 
judges and jurors to quantify the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
and the preponderance of the evidence standard as percentage proba-
                                                                                                                  
nition, ‘clear and convincing’ evidence has been described as evidence which produces in 
the mind of the trier of fact ‘an abiding conviction that the truth of [the] factual contentions 
are ‘highly probable.’’” (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984))), and
State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979) (“Clear and convincing evidence is 
defined as that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of fact 
a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”). 
55. See, e.g., KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, 3 FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 104:02 (6th ed. 2012) (“Clear and convincing evidence 
involves a greater degree of persuasion than is necessary to meet the preponderance of the 
evidence standard. This standard does not require proof to an absolute certainty, since proof 
to an absolute certainty is seldom possible in any case.”). 
56. Addington, 441 U.S. at 424. 
57. Id. at 431–33. 
58. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966). 
59. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982). 
60. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
61. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(en banc). 
62. Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
63. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Although the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), has switched U.S. 
patent law to a first-inventor-to-file system for all patent applications filed on or after March 
16, 2013, interference proceedings commenced before September 16, 2012, involving patent 
applications filed before the AIA’s effective date are unaffected by this change. See AIA § 
6(f)(3)(B); 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(d) (2012). 
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bilities.64 Both judges and jurors believed that the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard demanded a high likelihood in order to be satisfied. 
Specifically, the median judge quantified this standard as requiring 
88% probability (i.e., 8.8 on a 10-point scale), with almost a third of 
judges responding that it required 100% probability (i.e., 10.0) and 
another third that it required 90% or 95% probability (i.e., 9.0 or 
9.5).65 Similarly, the median juror66 quantified the beyond a reasona-
ble doubt standard as requiring 86% probability (i.e., 8.6 on a 10-point 
scale), with over a third articulating it as requiring 100% probability 
(i.e., 10.0) and another third between 80% and 95% probability (i.e., 
8.0 to 9.5).67
In the same study, however, judges and jurors substantially disa-
greed about the percentage likelihood needed to satisfy the preponder-
ance standard. For the median judge, this standard was satisfied with a 
54% probability (i.e., 5.4 on a 10-point scale).68 In contrast, the medi-
an juror believed that 75% probability was required (i.e., 7.5 on a 10-
point scale) to satisfy the preponderance standard.69
In the early 1980s, C.M.A. McCauliff conducted a survey of all 
active, senior, and retired federal judges regarding the level of certain-
ty, on a scale of 0%–100%, required by nine phrases treated as stand-
ards of proof.70 Her results generally paralleled the judges’ responses 
in the Simon & Mahan study. For preponderance of the evidence, the 
                                                                                                                  
64. See generally Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A 
View from the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 319 (1971). The 
survey contacted a nationwide sample of federal and state judges by mail. Id. at 320; see
also Rita James Simon, Judges’ Translations of Burdens of Proof into Statements of Proba-
bility, in THE TRIAL LAWYER’S GUIDE 103, 109–13 (John J. Kennelly et al. eds., 1969) 
(explaining the results of the judges’ survey). 
Some academics argue that the standards of proof cannot be reduced to a “mere statistical 
probability” and instead are interpreted by jurors as referring to varying degrees of “belief.” 
See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Proving Causation: Probability Versus Belief, in
PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 195 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011). Regardless of how one 
conceptualizes the standards of proof, it is undisputed that a clear and convincing burden is 
meant to be a higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence burden. 
65. Simon & Mahan, supra note 64, at 324 tbl.4. 
66. Jurors in the Simon & Mahan study consisted of a sample of people called for jury 
service in state court in Champaign County, Illinois. Id. at 320–21. 
67. Id. However, a quarter of jurors reported 50%–60% probability (i.e., score of 5.0 to 
6.0 on a 10-point scale) for the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Id.
68. Id. at 327 tbl.7. However, a surprising number of judges — almost 20% of respond-
ents (62 of 334, excluding 17 not answering) — reported a score exceeding 7.0 (greater than 
or equal to 70% probability) for preponderance of the evidence. Id.
69. Id. at 327 tbl.7. This included more than 10% of respondents (8 of 69) who reported 
the highest possible score of 10.0 on a 10-point scale (i.e., 100% probability) for the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard. Id.
70. C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or 
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1324–25 (1982). The nine phrases 
used to articulate standards of proof in McCauliff’s study were “beyond a reasonable 
doubt,” “clear and convincing evidence,” “clearly erroneous,” “preponderance of the evi-
dence,” “more probable than not,” “substantial evidence,” “probable cause to believe,” 
“reasonable cause to believe,” and “reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1325 n.184. 
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overwhelming majority of judges (154 of 175) equated this standard 
with a probability of 50% or 60%, with an average probability of 
55.3%.71 For beyond a reasonable doubt, nearly all judges (160 of 
171) rated this standard between 80% to 100% probability, with an 
average probability of 90.3%.72 Finally, for the clear and convincing 
evidence standard, the majority of judges (111 of 170) rated this 
standard as 70% to 80% probability, with an average probability of 
75.0%.73
More recently, Bradley Saxton surveyed actual jurors in civil and 
criminal cases after trial to determine their comprehension of various 
jury instructions, including instructions regarding the standard of 
proof.74 In criminal cases, jurors were asked whether the state only 
needed to convince the jury “that it is more likely than not” that the 
defendant committed the accused crime.75 The vast majority of ju-
rors — almost 85% — correctly responded that they were “very sure” 
or “pretty sure” this statement was false, while almost 10% were 
“very sure” or “pretty sure” it was true and 6% did not know.76 In civ-
il cases, jurors were asked the opposite question — whether the jury 
“has to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff’s 
claims are correct.”77 The results for this question suggested that a 
significant number of jurors misunderstood the preponderance stand-
ard: 38% incorrectly responded that they were “very sure” or “pretty 
sure” it was true, while an additional 3% did not know.78
In sum, these studies suggest that judges generally understand the 
preponderance standard to be satisfied by any probability exceeding 
50%, clear and convincing evidence to be in the range of 70% to 80% 
probability, and beyond a reasonable doubt to require at least 80% 
probability.79 It is unclear whether lay jurors have a similar under-
                                                                                                                  
71. Id. at 1331 tbl.7, 1332 tbl.8. Of the remaining respondents, 7 judges (out of 175) rated 
preponderance of the evidence at 70% probability, another 7 judges rated it 80% probability, 
3 judges rated it at 90% probability, another 3 judges rated it at 100% probability, and 1 
judge (bizarrely) rated it at 0% probability. Id. at 1331 tbl.7. 
72. Id. at 1325 tbl.2, 1332 tbl.8. 
73. Id. at 1328 tbl.5, 1332 tbl.8. Of the remaining respondents, 4 judges (out of 170) rated 
clear and convincing evidence at 50%–55% probability, 27 judges rated it at 60%–65% 
probability, 24 rated it at 85%–90% probability, and 4 judges rated it at 95%–100% proba-
bility. Id. at 1328 tbl.5. 
74. Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field Test Us-
ing Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59 (1998) (survey-
ing jurors in Wyoming state courts). 
75. Id. at 98 fig.13. 
76. Id. (N = 183). 
77. Id. at 100 fig.14. 
78. Id. (N = 68). For the remaining (correct) respondents, 22% were “pretty sure” it was 
false, while 37% were “very sure” it was false. Id.
79. In addition to the studies listed above, in the late 1970s, Judge Jack Weinstein — the 
author of several treatises on evidence and procedure — reported the results of an informal 
survey of ten of his colleagues on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York regarding probabilities associated with these three standards of proof. The surveyed 
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standing. The Simon & Mahan and Saxton studies surveying actual 
jurors had sample sizes that were too small to draw definitive conclu-
sions, failed to ask for a percentage probability for all three standards 
of proof, or both. However, these studies suggest that some jurors 
perceive the preponderance standard to be somewhat more rigorous 
than do judges. Furthermore, these surveys do not test whether jurors 
or judges actually apply these standards consistently in litigation. 
2. Experimental Studies 
Another area of empirical research has been the use of experi-
ments to test the impact of standards of proof as articulated in jury 
instructions, primarily in criminal cases. In several experiments, “the 
wording used to convey the standard of proof” was found to have “a 
substantial impact” on mock jurors’ verdicts.80
In a study conducted by the Jury Project at the London School of 
Economics in the early 1970s, panels of mock jurors in the United 
Kingdom heard a tape-recorded trial of a rape case.81 The only varia-
tion was the jury instruction on the standard of proof.82 Two groups of 
mock juries received differing instructions regarding the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard,83 while a third group received a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard.84 The juries’ conviction rates were 
highest for the preponderance instruction, slightly lower for the first 
reasonable doubt instruction, and much lower for the second reasona-
                                                                                                                  
judges all reported that any probability greater than 50% would satisfy the preponderance of 
the evidence standard; most estimated the clear and convincing evidence standard as be-
tween 60% and 75% (although several judges refused to assign a discrete value); and the 
judges reported that the probability associated with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
was between 76% and 95% (with a median of 85%). United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 
388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979). 
80. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on 
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 665 (2001). 
81. London Sch. of Econ., Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208 
[hereinafter L.S.E. Jury Project], discussed in Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb  
on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 
1309–10 (1977). 
82. See Underwood, supra note 81. 
83. See Underwood, supra note 81. The first beyond a reasonable doubt instruction stat-
ed: “[Before you convict] you should be sure beyond reasonable doubt and by reasonable 
doubt I mean not a fanciful doubt that you might use to avoid an unpleasant decision, but a 
doubt for which reasons can be given.” See Underwood, supra note 81 at 1309 (alteration in 
original) (quoting L.S.E. Jury Project, supra note 81, at 213) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The second beyond a reasonable doubt instruction stated: “Before you convict you 
must feel sure and certain on the evidence you have heard that the accused is guilty.” Un-
derwood, supra note 81, (quoting L.S.E. Jury Project, supra note 81, at 213) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
84. Underwood, supra note 81, at 1310 (“[B]efore you convict you must feel satisfied 
that it is more likely than not that the accused is guilty.” (alteration in original) (quoting 
L.S.E. Jury Project, supra note 81, at 214) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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ble doubt instruction.85 This study “suggests that jurors can distin-
guish between” preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasona-
ble doubt standards, although one jury scholar noted that the specific 
wording of jury instructions regarding the latter standard could result 
in substantially different outcomes.86
In a 1985 article, Dorothy K. Kagehiro and W. Clark Stanton re-
ported the results of several experiments that tested all three standards 
of proof using jury instructions that explained the relevant standard 
either as a percentage probability (“quantified definition”) or with a 
conventional model jury instruction that did not explicitly quantify 
each standard (“legal definition”).87 The subjects, undergraduate psy-
chology students, were divided into an experimental and a control 
group.88 All subjects were presented with a summary of the evidence 
in a civil trial.89 Then the subjects in the experimental group, but not 
the subjects in the control group, were instructed regarding the stand-
ard of proof.90 Finally, all subjects were asked to individually reach a 
decision regarding the plaintiff’s claim.91 The authors reported that 
although “verdicts favoring the plaintiffs decreased as the standard 
became stricter” in both experiments,92 these differences were only 
statistically significant for the quantified definitions.93 In contrast, 
“[f]or the legal definitions, the multivariate effect [for the] standard of 
proof was not significant.”94
In 1996, Irwin A. Horowitz and Laird C. Kirkpatrick tested the 
impact of various definitions of the reasonable doubt standard.95 The 
subjects — jury-eligible adults — heard one of two versions of a 
murder trial, one that was calibrated to be a “weak” case likely to re-
sult in a not guilty verdict, while the other was a “strong” case with 
                                                                                                                  
85. Id.
86. Id. Similarly, in another study led by Norbert L. Kerr in the mid-1970s, mock jurors 
reached statistically significant outcomes regarding a rape trial depending on the particular 
jury instruction used to define reasonable doubt. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Guilt Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judg-
ments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 282 (1976). 
87. Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Stand-
ards of Proof, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 161–63 (1985).
88. Id. at 162. 
89. Id. at 162, 165–66. 
90. Id.
91. Id. For the first experiment, N = 198 (after excluding 54 respondents because  
of errors on one or more manipulation checks), and for the second experiment, N = 220.  
Id. at 163, 165. 
92. Id. at 164–65, 168. 
93. Id. at 164, 168 (p < 0.001 for the first experiment using the quantified definition, 
p < 0.001 for the second experiment using the quantified definition). 
94. Id. at 164. 
95. Irwin A. Horowitz & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, A Concept In Search of a Definition: The 
Effects of Reasonable Doubt Instructions on Certainty of Guilt Standards and Jury Verdicts,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655 (1996). 
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evidence strongly suggestive of guilt.96 Each juror then received one 
of five definitions of reasonable doubt and was asked to reach a pre-
liminary decision.97 Subsequently, panels of mock juries were assem-
bled and deliberated with no time limitation.98 The authors reported 
statistically significant differences between mock juries that received 
varying definitions of reasonable doubt.99
In general, although some of these experiments have limitations 
that impact their external validity — such as the use of undergraduate 
psychology students rather than a more broadly representative popula-
tion — and the evidence is not clear cut,100 they cumulatively suggest 
that jurors’ decisions may be swayed by the standard of proof. In ad-
dition, they imply that the particular wording of jury instructions can 
play a significant role in jurors’ decision making. However, none of 
the previous empirical studies directly answers the question we study 
here — whether altering the burden of proof in civil litigation is likely 
to result in different outcomes by a diverse, broadly representative 
group of jury-eligible citizens. This unresolved question is the subject 
of our experiment. 
III. MICROSOFT V. I4I AND THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY IN 
PATENT LAW
Section 282 of the Patent Act, first adopted in 1952, expressly 
provides that patents are to be presumed valid, but does not specify 
the standard of proof.101 Before the creation of the Federal Circuit in 
1982, some of the regional circuits held that, in certain circumstances, 
the standard for overcoming the presumption of validity was prepon-
                                                                                                                  
96. Id. at 661. 
97. Id. at 661–62. The authors labeled the definitions (1) “firmly convinced” (based on 
the Federal Judicial Center’s instructions), (2) “moral certainty,” (3) “does not waver or 
vacillate,” (4) “real doubt,” or (5) “undefined” (for no explanation). Id. at 660–61. 
98. Id. at 661. However, a so-called “Allen” charge (a jury instruction intended to prevent 
a hung jury by encouraging jurors in the minority to reconsider their positions) was given 
after 90 minutes of deliberation. All mock juries eventually reached a decision. Id.
99. Id. at 662–63 & tbl.1. Specifically, in the “weak” case, the “firmly convinced”  
instruction differed significantly (lower) from all other instructions (p < 0.05), while in  
the “strong” case, the “moral certainty” instruction was marginally more significant  
(higher) compared to the “does not waver or vacillate” and “undefined” instructions.  
Id. at 663 & tbl.1. 
100. See Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Preci-
sion and Flexibility in Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 769, 774–76 (2000) (summarizing previous studies, including Kagehiro & Stanton, 
supra note 87, and concluding that “[e]mpirical research indicates that jurors may have 
some difficulty distinguishing” the clear and convincing standard of proof). 
101. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006 & Supp. V 2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid . . . . 
The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party 
asserting such invalidity.”). 
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derance of the evidence.102 However, the Federal Circuit, in a decision 
not long after its creation, held that the proper standard of proof was 
clear and convincing evidence.103 According to the Federal Circuit, 
the clear and convincing standard is “constant and never changes.”104
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court directly confronted the question 
of how high the standard of proof should be for proving patent inva-
lidity in litigation.105 More specifically, the Court in i4i examined 
whether Section 282 of the Patent Act required clear and convincing 
evidence to overcome a patent’s presumption of validity. 
In the lower courts, Microsoft unsuccessfully challenged i4i’s pa-
tent on the basis that i4i had previously sold software that embodied 
the invention more than one year before it applied for a patent, which 
if true would render it invalid under Section 102(b) of the Patent 
Act.106 Because the prior art sale of software had not been presented 
by i4i to the Patent Examiner when the USPTO was considering i4i’s 
patent application, Microsoft argued that it should be required to 
prove invalidity by only a preponderance of the evidence.107 The dis-
trict court judge rejected Microsoft’s contention, ruled that Microsoft 
had to prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence, and denied 
Microsoft’s request for an alternative instruction.108 Thereafter, the 
jury found Microsoft to have willfully infringed i4i’s patent, rejected 
Microsoft’s invalidity defense, and awarded over $200 million in 
damages.109 The Federal Circuit affirmed the finding of infringement, 
validity, and the damages award.110 The Supreme Court granted Mi-
crosoft’s petition for certiorari on the issue of the proper standard of 
proof for Microsoft’s invalidity defense.111
At the Supreme Court, Microsoft advanced two arguments in 
support of reversal. First, it asserted that an accused infringer need 
only prove a patent claim invalid by a preponderance of the evidence, 
                                                                                                                  
102. See, e.g., Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061, 1066 (5th Cir. 1982) (stating that 
when a patent is challenged for failure to consider prior art, “the challenger of the validity of 
the patent need no longer bear the heavy burden of establishing invalidity either ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt’ or ‘by clear and convincing evidence.’”); Mfg. Research Corp. v. Graybar 
Elec. Co., 679 F.2d 1355, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that the trial court “erred in in-
structing the jury to apply a clear and convincing evidence standard to the defense of inva-
lidity” when the prior art evidence admitted at trial had not been considered by the USPTO). 
103. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
1984).
104. Id.
105. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011). 
106. Id. at 2243–44 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)). 
107. Id. at 2244. 
108. Id. (discussing the district court proceedings). 
109. See i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 839 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discuss-
ing the district court proceedings). 
110. Id.
111. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (mem.). Microsoft did 
not seek Supreme Court review of the decisions on willful infringement and damages.  
i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2238. 
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rather than by clear and convincing evidence.112 Because § 282 was 
silent regarding the standard for carrying the burden of proving inva-
lidity, Microsoft contended that “the default standard of proof in civil 
cases” — preponderance of the evidence — should apply.113 In addi-
tion, it argued that the private property rights granted by a patent fell 
outside the “narrow category of cases implicating uniquely important 
individual liberty interests,” which “warrant a heightened standard of 
proof.”114
Second, Microsoft argued in the alternative that the preponder-
ance of the evidence standard was required at least when the party 
challenging the patent’s validity relied on prior art references not con-
sidered by the USPTO.115 Even if a heightened standard of proof was 
warranted out of deference to the USPTO’s decision to grant a patent, 
this deference was appropriate only when the Patent Examiner had 
actually considered the relevant evidence regarding patentability.116 If 
the examiner had not considered some of the relevant prior art, then, 
as the Court stated in KSR v. Teleflex, “the rationale underlying the 
presumption of . . . validity — that the [US]PTO, in its expertise, has 
approved the claim — seems much diminished . . . . ”117
In response, i4i argued that prior to the adoption of the 1952 Pa-
tent Act, the Supreme Court had “repeatedly and consistently held that 
the presumption of patent validity imposed a heightened standard to 
prove invalidity.”118 Section 282, i4i contended, codified this com-
mon-law precedent.119 In addition, i4i argued that the Federal Circuit 
had correctly required a heightened standard for proving invalidity 
because such a standard both promoted innovation by “foster[ing] 
strong, stable patent rights” and “properly incorporate[d] deference to 
the [US]PTO.”120
The Supreme Court rejected both of Microsoft’s proposals.121 It 
first analyzed the statutory text of Section 282 of the Patent Act. The 
Court concluded that although the statute clearly provided that the 
party challenging a patent claim’s validity bore the burden of proof, 
                                                                                                                  
112. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2244. 
113. Brief for Petitioner at 14–15, i4i, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290). 
114. Id. at 8, 16–18. 
115. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2244, 2249. 
116. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 113, at 51–53. 
117. Id. at 2 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 426 (2007)). 
118. Brief for Respondents at 12, i4i, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-290) (citing, inter 
alia, Smith v. Hall, 301 U.S. 216, 233 (1937), and Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g 
Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1, 2 (1934)).
119. Id. at 15 (“[B]y 1952 this Court had made clear that the common-law presumption 
of validity imposed a clear-and-convincing standard of proof. Congress’s use of these terms 
in § 282 means the Court ‘must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress 
mean[t] to incorporate’ that standard.” (alteration in original) (quoting Neder v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999))). 
120. Id. at 30, 39. 
121. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2244. 
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the statute was silent on the standard of proof.122 The Supreme Court 
was clear that the statute’s use of “burden of proof” referred to the 
“burden of persuasion.”123 The statute also specified that patents are 
“presumed valid.”124 The Court further agreed with i4i’s argument 
that the phrase “presumed valid” had a settled meaning at the time of 
Section 282’s adoption that incorporated a heightened standard of 
proof.125 The Supreme Court relied heavily upon its 1934 decision in 
Radio Corporation of America v. Radio Engineering Laboratories, 
Inc. (“RCA”).126 In RCA, Justice Cardozo’s majority opinion held that 
a patent challenger “bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and fails un-
less his evidence has more than a dubious preponderance.”127 As a 
result, the “dubious” preponderance standard was insufficient to find a 
patent invalid.128
Older Supreme Court decisions used similarly unequivocal lan-
guage to describe the standard of proof for finding a patent invalid. 
For instance, in 1874, the Court described the burden of proof relating 
to prior inventorship as “rest[ing] upon [the defendant], and every 
reasonable doubt should be resolved against him.”129 Relying upon 
these cases, the Supreme Court held in i4i that the term “presumption 
of validity” had a settled meaning when the Patent Act was adopted in 
1952 that required the patent challenger to satisfy this heightened 
standard of proof by clear and convincing evidence.130
The Court also addressed Microsoft’s alternative argument that 
the preponderance standard should apply at least where evidence at 
trial was not provided to the USPTO during examination of the patent. 
The Court was reluctant to adopt a fluctuating standard that might 
require different burdens of proof within a single lawsuit.131 However, 
the Court acknowledged that numerous courts of appeals before the 
1952 Act stated that the presumption of validity was “weakened” or 
“dissipated” when the evidence had not previously been considered by 
the USPTO.132 Despite this acknowledgement, the Court rejected the 
                                                                                                                  
122. Id. at 2245 (“[W]hile [35 U.S.C. § 282] explicitly specifies the burden of proof, it 
includes no express articulation of the standard of proof.”); see also id. at 2254 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (noting that “§ 282 is silent as to the standard of proof”). 
123. Id. at 2245 n.4. 
124. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006 & Supp. V 2012). 
125. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2245 (“[B]y stating that a patent is ‘presumed valid,’ § 282, Con-
gress used a term with a settled common-law meaning.”). 
126. 293 U.S. 1 (1934). 
127. Id. at 8. 
128. Id.
129. Coffin v. Ogden, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 120, 124 (1874). 
130. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2246. 
131. Id. at 2250. 
132. Id. at 2250–51 (citing Jacuzzi Bros., Inc. v. Berkeley Pump Co., 191 F.2d 632, 634 
(9th Cir. 1951) (“largely dissipated”); Gillette Safety Razor Co. v. Cliff Weil Cigar Co., 107 
F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir. 1939) (“greatly weakened”); Butler Mfg. Co. v. Enterprise Cleaning 
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view that these statements meant that the standard of proof should be 
anything but clear and convincing.133 Thus, the Court held that a pa-
tent claim must be proven invalid by clear and convincing evidence in 
all circumstances. 
However, and important for our study, the Court decided that new 
evidence in invalidity challenges was entitled to different treatment in 
jury instructions.134 The Court noted that previously unconsidered 
evidence may “carry more weight” than evidence previously reviewed 
by the USPTO.135 While the burden of proof always remains clear and 
convincing, the Court noted that a special instruction may be provided 
to the jury in these circumstances: 
[I]f the [US]PTO did not have all material facts be-
fore it, its considered judgment may lose significant 
force. And, concomitantly, the challenger’s burden 
to persuade the jury of its invalidity defense by clear 
and convincing evidence may be easier to sustain. In 
this respect, although we have no occasion to en-
dorse any particular formulation, we note that a jury 
instruction on the effect of new evidence can, and 
when requested, most often should be given. When 
warranted, the jury may be instructed to consider that 
it has heard evidence that the [US]PTO had no op-
portunity to evaluate before granting the patent.136
Thus, the Court urged district court judges to provide a special jury 
instruction when new evidence regarding invalidity was first present-
ed in litigation.137 While the Court apparently felt that the burden of 
proof always remained clear and convincing, this language suggested 
the burden might be somewhat easier to satisfy in these circumstanc-
es.
                                                                                                                  
Co., 81 F.2d 711, 716 (8th Cir. 1936) (“weakened”); H. Schindler & Co. v. C. Saladino & 
Sons, 81 F.2d 649, 651 (1st Cir. 1936) (“weakened”)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
133. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2251 (“[W]e cannot read these cases to hold or even to suggest that 
a preponderance standard would apply in such circumstances, and we decline to impute 
such a reading to Congress.”). 
134. We recognize that some may interpret the i4i decision as altering the weight given to 
previously unconsidered evidence. While this does not formally alter the standard of proof 
as a theoretical matter, it may be seen as performing an equivalent function. In other words, 
while the Court held that the standard remained unchanged, it raised the value of this uncon-
sidered evidence such that the burden could be overcome more easily. Regardless of how i4i
is interpreted, we have based our experiment upon model instructions that are used to ex-
plain the standard of proof to juries in patent litigation. 
135. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2251 (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 
F.2d 1350, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
136. i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2251 (citation omitted). 
137. Id.
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND STUDY DESIGN
A. Hypotheses About i4i’s Impact 
The impact of changing the standard of proof on jurors’ decisions 
in civil cases is uncertain. More specifically, in the area of patent law, 
intellectual property scholars and others have disagreed about the ef-
fect of changing the standard for proving a patent invalid. For exam-
ple, Doug Lichtman and Mark Lemley argue that “[w]hile we can’t 
prove that presumptions matter, we believe that they likely do, at least 
at the margins.”138 However, they admit that “this is an area of uncer-
tainty,” and the legal community “know[s] far less than [it] should 
about how presumptions affect litigation decisions.”139
Judge William Alsup, who has presided over numerous patent 
cases in the Northern District of California, has called the clear and 
convincing standard a “legal earthwork fortified by a protective moat” 
that creates “a huge advantage for the patent holder” in validity chal-
lenges.140 Similarly, in a brief filed in the i4i case, Apple and Intel — 
which both own large patent portfolios and appear as frequent defend-
ants in infringement litigation — argued that the clear and convincing 
evidence standard “has a compelling effect on jurors” and “insulate[s] 
weak patents from invalidity verdicts.”141
Mark Janis has asserted that “the precise verbal formulation that 
we use for the standard of evidence for overcoming the presumption” 
of patent validity may be at least as important as the standard itself.142
As a result, he argues that “one possible outcome of . . . the prepon-
derance standard for overcoming the presumption of patent validity is 
that [it] will cause little difference in the outcomes of cases.”143
Based on the assumption that standards of proof matter, we de-
veloped three hypotheses for our experiment: 
                                                                                                                  
138. Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Valid-
ity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 69–70 (2007); see also id. at 70 (“We don’t know exactly how 
often the presumption makes a difference to a case outcome. But we are confident that it 
does in at least some cases . . . . ”). 
139. Id. at 69. 
140. William Alsup, A District Judge’s Proposal for Patent Reform: Revisiting the Clear 
and Convincing Standard and Calibrating Deference to the Strength of the Examination, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1647, 1648 (2009). 
141. Brief of Apple Inc. and Intel Corp., supra note 17, at 15, 19. 
142. Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious Preponder-
ance,” 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923, 927 (2004); see also id. at 935 (asserting that “merely 
changing the language of the patent law standard to ‘preponderance’ by no means ensures 
that courts will converge around a uniform approach to assessing patent validity evidence”). 
143. Id. at 927; see also Paul F. Morgan, Guest Post: Microsoft v. i4i — Is the Sky Really 
Falling?, PATENTLYO (Jan. 9, 2011), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/microsoft-
v-i4i-is-the-sky-really-falling.html (expressing skepticism that “the very small percentage of 
patents now being held invalid by juries would somehow greatly increase due to this one 
potential change [to a preponderance standard] in jury instructions”). 
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1. A clear and convincing standard will result in fewer findings of 
invalidity than a preponderance standard. 
2. A clear and convincing standard will result in fewer findings of 
invalidity than the same standard combined with an i4i-type in-
struction.
3. A clear and convincing standard combined with an i4i-type in-
struction will result in fewer findings of invalidity than a prepon-
derance standard. 
As explained in the following section, we used an experimental ap-
proach to test each of these hypotheses. 
B. Why an Experiment? 
Using an experimental methodology to measure the effect of var-
ying the standard of proof has many important advantages. There is 
burgeoning literature about experiments conducted by legal schol-
ars.144 Experiments permit the manipulation of a single variable to 
determine if changes in that variable affect other variables.145 Like a 
classic double-blind medical experiment, this method permits us to 
randomly assign the change, in our case the standard of proof, while 
holding everything else constant. Any differences in results between 
conditions thus can be attributed to the randomly assigned variable, 
the standard of proof.146
We decided against a common approach used by empirical legal 
scholars: studying observational data.147 Studying standards of proof 
                                                                                                                  
144. For examples of legal scholarship based upon experiments, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN
ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE (2002); Christopher Buccafusco & Chris-
topher J. Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (2011); Christopher Bucca-
fusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (2010); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on 
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Gregory N. Mandel, 
Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent 
Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006); Andrew W. Torrance & Bill Tomlinson, 
Patents and the Regress of Useful Arts, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 130 (2009). 
145. See ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN,
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 93 (2010) (“Experiments are particularly useful when the 
goal of the research project is to explore one or more causes of a phenomenon. Indeed, the 
purpose of an experiment is to isolate the effect of one variable on another.”). 
146. Id. at 94 (explaining that isolating the “specific variable of interest” in an  
experiment addresses the “question[] of cause and effect” by “eliminati[ng] . . .  
confounding variables”). 
147. For examples of empirical scholarship based on observational data in patent litiga-
tion, see John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and Settlement 
Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677 (2011); Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonob-
viousness and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE
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by relying on observational data is extremely difficult. Unlike exper-
iments, observational data is not controlled by the researcher.148 In-
stead, the researcher records the data after it occurs naturally.149 The 
fact that the studied conditions are not randomly assigned makes it 
more difficult to draw causal inferences from observational data than 
from experiments.150
For our particular research question, we believe that an experi-
mental approach offers several advantages compared to observational 
data generated in litigation. First, the courts do not frequently change 
the standard of proof. Consequently, almost all cases in a given area 
of law are decided using the same standard. In particular, if we want-
ed to rely upon observational data to analyze the effect, if any, of the 
Supreme Court’s decision regarding the standard for proving a patent 
invalid, we would need to wait for a sufficient number of trials to oc-
cur, which would likely take years.151 Furthermore, observational data 
from litigation would not be available for one of the possible stand-
ards of proof — preponderance of the evidence — because this stand-
ard was explicitly rejected by the Court. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, if the standard of proof is 
changed, then other features of the cases may change as well. For in-
stance, different cases may settle before trial if the ultimate question 
for the jury is based upon a clear and convincing standard of proof as 
                                                                                                                  
DAME L. REV. 911 (2007); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does 
Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 901 (2001); Kimberly A. 
Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases — An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 365, 367 (2000) [hereinafter Moore, Black Box]; Lee Petherbridge, Jason 
Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical As-
sessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293 (2011); Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421 (2008); David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical 
Study of Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts 
and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699 (2009); David L. 
Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1157 (2011); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); Christopher 
B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In Re Seagate: An 
Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417 (2012); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the 
Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA.
L. REV. 1105 (2004). 
148. See Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil 
Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1132 (2002) (“Observational research differs 
from experimental research in that any testing of the effect of a treatment does not take 
place under conditions that the researcher controls.”). 
149. See LAWLESS, ROBBENNOLT & ULEN, supra note 145, at 126 (“Archival data has the 
benefit of being drawn from real-world sources.”). 
150. See Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 
23 (2009) (explaining that the “best empirical studies on causation often rely on random 
assignments to treatment and control groups”). 
151. See, e.g., Seaman, supra note 147 (conducting a study of willful patent infringement 
and enhanced damages decisions in the district courts for a three-year period after the Fed-
eral Circuit’s en banc decision in In re Seagate Techs. LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)).
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opposed to a mere preponderance standard.152 In other words, chang-
ing the standard of proof may also result in different cases being se-
lected for resolution by juries. Priest and Klein famously argue that 
regardless of the law, cases where there is a high degree of certainty 
regarding the outcome will settle, so those cases that are tried are al-
ways the closest cases, the 50-50 cases.153 Regardless of whether se-
lection effects actually result in a 50-50 split for the resolution of 
individual issues like patent invalidity,154 any significant change in the 
types of cases that reach a jury can make it more difficult to unpack 
causal relationships. An experimental approach overcomes these 
problems by permitting the researcher to control for all variables other 
than the one being studied.155
                                                                                                                  
152. See Fredrick E. Vars, Toward a General Theory of Standards of Proof, 60 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1, 34 (2010) (suggesting that in some circumstances a “clear-and-convincing stand-
ard of proof could reduce uncertainty and thereby facilitate settlement” of some claims, 
although “a higher percentage of cases that are close to the heightened proof threshold . . . 
[may] fail to settle”). 
153. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6 (1984). 
154. For an argument that the Priest-Klein hypothesis only applies to the selection of dis-
putes, not the selection of individual issues in patent litigation, see Jason Rantanen, Why
Priest-Klein Cannot Apply to Individual Issues in Patent Cases (Univ. of Iowa Legal Stud-
ies, Research Paper No. 12-15, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2132810.
155. A recent article about our topic, the effect of the i4i decision on patent litigation, ex-
emplifies some of the difficulties of using observational data from litigation to study stand-
ards of proof. See Etan S. Chatlynne, Stephen Kenny & Lucas Watkins, Investigating Patent 
Law’s Presumption of Validity, Part II: An Empirical Analysis of How Unconsidered Evi-
dence and Evidentiary Standards Affect Jury Verdicts, 2011 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 46 
(2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1799706. In that 
study, the researchers compared a first set of patent cases decided from 1966 until 1982 to a 
second set of patent cases decided from 2008 until 2010. Id. at 48–49. The authors assert 
that the first set of cases was from a time period when courts used a preponderance standard 
when the party challenging validity introduced evidence that had not been considered by the 
USPTO, and the second set of cases was when courts used a clear and convincing standard. 
Id. at 48–50. The authors failed to find a significant difference in outcomes between the two 
time periods and therefore concluded that the standard of proof — preponderance or clear 
and convincing — “may not be as significant a driver in invalidity outcomes as some have 
suggested.” See id. at 54 (finding that challengers introducing new evidence prevailed under 
a preponderance standard 32% of the time from 1966 to 1982 and prevailed under a clear 
and convincing evidence standard 34% of the time from 2008 to 2010). 
However, there are several reasons to view the results of this prior study with caution, as 
the authors themselves note. See id. at 54–55 (“The comparison herein of data from periods 
separated by more than twenty-five years surely implicates additional factors such as chang-
es in applicable practice, procedure, search technology and much of the surrounding body of 
legal rules . . . .”). In particular, numerous major changes occurred in patent litigation be-
tween the two time periods studied that would result in strong selection effects. One is the 
Federal Circuit’s 1995 en banc decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., which 
held that claim construction — the process of interpreting the scope of the patent — was a 
matter of law for the court. 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 
(1996). Another is the rise of jury trials in patent cases. Before 1982, nearly all patent cases 
were tried to judges; starting in the 1990s, however, the majority of patent cases reaching 
trial were decided by juries. See Moore, Black Box, supra note 147, at 366 (finding that 
from 1968 to 1970, juries tried only 2.8% of patent cases; in contrast, from 1997 to 1999, 
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C. Study Design 
After deciding upon an experimental methodology, we turned to 
study design. We desired a patent litigation scenario that was under-
standable to subjects, so we shied away from describing a dispute in-
volving complex technology, such as biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, 
or computer software. Thus, we created a one-and-a-third page fact 
pattern based upon a real case (not i4i) involving a relatively simple 
technology — golf ball design.156 We also wanted a fact pattern with-
out a clear answer in law. In other words, we wanted the subjects to 
have some discretion on which way they decided the case. The case 
selected as the basis for our fact pattern provided this, as it involved 
two separate jury verdicts that reached opposite conclusions regarding 
invalidity,157 and the Federal Circuit on appeal stated that “the evi-
dence at trial was such that the jury could have rationally reached ei-
ther verdict with regard to [the invalidity of] the asserted claims.”158
The same fact pattern and summary of the arguments were pro-
vided to all subjects using a between-subjects design.159 We limited 
the fact pattern to a single issue: whether the patent was invalid be-
cause it was obvious. Under the law, a patent is obvious if the differ-
ences between the prior art and the invention would have been 
apparent to a person in the field at the time the invention was made.160
To focus our experiment on the effect of jury instructions, we ran-
domly assigned the subjects one of three different jury instructions, as 
described in more detail below. A copy of the fact pattern, summary 
                                                                                                                  
juries tried 59% of patent cases). Third, summary judgment practice radically changed be-
tween 1966 and 2009, most notably with the Celotex trilogy of opinions issued in 1986, thus 
affecting which cases ultimately reach trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
156. Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
157. In Callaway, the jury in the initial trial found that one dependent claim (claim 5) of 
the patent-in-suit was invalid for obviousness, but the remaining eight claims — including 
the independent claim (claim 4) on which the invalid dependent claim was based — were 
not proven invalid. See id. at 1337. On appeal, the Federal Circuit vacated the judgment and 
remanded for a new trial on obviousness, finding that “the verdict form returned by the jury 
reflects an irreconcilable inconsistency” regarding invalidity. Id. at 1345. After retrial, the 
second jury found all asserted claims invalid as anticipated and obvious. Callaway Golf Co. 
v. Acushnet Co., 778 F. Supp. 2d 487, 491 (D. Del. 2011). The District Court denied the 
patentee’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that the second jury’s invalidity 
decision was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 505. 
158. Callaway Golf Co., 576 F.3d at 1344. 
159. See generally Robert A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behav-
ioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1680 (2003) (“In between-subjects 
experiments, some subjects are tested under condition A and their responses are compared 
to those of subjects tested under condition B.”). 
160. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006 & Supp. V 2012); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 
398, 399 (2007). Technically, the claims of a patent are determined obvious (or not obvious) 
on an individual, claim-by-claim basis. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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of the parties’ arguments, and the jury instructions used in the exper-
iment are reproduced in Appendix A. The sequence of steps in the 
experiment is reproduced in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Steps of the Experiment 
Our fact pattern involved a dispute regarding patent infringement 
between two fictitious competitors, Acme Golf, Inc. (“Acme”) and 
Bravo Sporting Equipment Co. (“Bravo”).161 Acme’s invention relat-
ed to a new “three-piece” golf ball which combined the features of 
                                                                                                                  
161. We used two competitors as the hypothetical litigants in our fact pattern to avoid a 
potential bias against non-practicing entities (“NPEs”), which have been the subject of 
significant controversy in patent law. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, 
Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 
N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1573–77 (2009); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barn-
yards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1818–19 
(2007); Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 458 (2012) (con-
tending that much of “the conventional wisdom about patent trolls” is inaccurate and that 
“patents enforced by so-called trolls — and the companies that obtained them — look a lot 
like other litigated patents and their owners”).
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prior art “two-piece” golf balls.162 The fact pattern explained that 
when the USPTO examined and allowed the application for a patent, 
it had only been aware of several two-piece golf balls but no three-
piece golf balls. However, during the course of litigation, these ficti-
tious parties discovered a prior patent (issued to an inventor named 
“Charles”) that disclosed a three-piece golf ball. This prior patent was 
different from the Acme invention (it used different materials for 
some of the layers), but it was closer than any of the prior art consid-
ered by the USPTO. Thus, as in the i4i case, a key piece of prior art 
had not been considered by the USPTO during examination and was 
offered as evidence in litigation by the party challenging the patent’s 
validity.
The scenario concluded with a paragraph describing each of Ac-
me’s and Bravo’s arguments regarding the issue of patent obvious-
ness.163 These arguments are ones commonly made by litigants in 
patent trials. For the patent owner, the summary stated that no indi-
vidual piece of prior art taught all of the elements of the claimed in-
vention, that the invention had benefits over the prior art, that the 
Charles patent was directed to a very different problem than the Acme 
patent, and that the jury should defer to the “trained Patent Examiner, 
who was in the best position to determine whether Acme’s claimed 
invention was obvious.”164 For the patent challenger, the summary 
argued that the Acme invention was merely a combination of preexist-
ing items, that the invention’s modification of the prior art was trivial, 
and that the jury should not defer to the Patent Examiner because the 
patent would not have been granted if the Examiner had known of the 
Charles patent.165
After the fact pattern and summary of the parties’ arguments, 
each subject received one of three randomly assigned jury instructions 
regarding the legal standard for determining whether the patent was 
invalid. The one-page jury instructions varied only regarding the 
standard of proof; they contained identical descriptions regarding ob-
viousness in patent law.166 For the standard of proof, three different 
                                                                                                                  
162. This is modeled on the statement of the District Court in Callaway:
[G]olf balls are typically identified as two-piece or three-piece balls. 
Two-piece balls have a core, which is either solid or “wound,” and an 
outer layer . . . . Three-piece balls have an additional layer covering 
the core, so that the ball is characterized as having a core, an inner 
cover layer and an outer cover layer. 
Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 778 F. Supp. 2d 487, 488–89 (D. Del. 2011). 
163. All subjects received the summary of the arguments in the same order: first Bravo 
(the patent challenger), then Acme (the patent holder). This was done to mimic the order of 
closing arguments at a trial limited to validity, where the party with the burden of persua-
sion — here, Bravo — typically goes first. 
164. See infra Appendix A. 
165. See infra Appendix A. 
166. Our jury instruction was adapted from several model jury patent instructions that 
were selected due to their perceived ease of comprehension as well as their conciseness. The 
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instructions were given: (1) clear and convincing evidence; (2) clear 
and convincing evidence with an additional instruction based upon the 
Court’s decision in i4i; and (3) preponderance of the evidence. We 
adapted language from model patent jury instructions promulgated by 
the American Intellectual Property Law Association (“AIPLA”)167
and the National Jury Instruction Project to explain these standards.168
Specifically, the instructions regarding these conditions stated:  
Clear and Convincing Evidence: 
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that 
shows it is highly probable that the patent was obvi-
ous. This is a higher standard of proof than a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, which means more 
probable than not. However, clear and convincing 
evidence is lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard used in criminal cases. 
Clear and Convincing Evidence with i4i-type Instruction:
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that 
shows it is highly probable that the patent was obvi-
ous. This is a higher standard of proof than a pre-
                                                                                                                  
first paragraph of the instruction, see infra Appendix A (“The fact that the USPTO grants a 
patent . . . . ”), was adapted from the Federal Circuit Bar Association’s model patent jury 
instructions. FED. CIR. BAR ASS’N, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTION § A.1 (2012), avail-
able at http://memberconnections.com/olc/filelib/LVFC/cpages/9004/Library/2012%20 
Updated%20FCBA%20Model%20Patent%20Jury%20Instructions.pdf (preliminary instruc-
tions). The second paragraph of the instruction, see infra Appendix A (“Under the law, 
Acme’s patent is presumed to be not obvious . . . . ”), was adapted from the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s model jury instructions for patent cases. See COMM. ON 
PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., FEDERAL CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR. §§ 11.1.14, 11.3.1 (2009), available at 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf (invalidity due to 
obviousness and validity generally). The third paragraph of the instruction, which contained 
the randomly selected condition regarding the standard of proof, see infra Appendix A (“To 
succeed on its claim . . . . ”), was adapted from the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association’s model patent jury instructions and the National Jury Instruction Project’s 
model patent jury instructions. See infra notes 167–168 and accompanying text. The final 
paragraph of the instruction, see infra Appendix A (“In deciding obviousness . . . . ”), was 
also adapted from the Seventh Circuit’s model jury instructions for patent cases. COMM. ON 
PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., FEDERAL CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR. § 11.3.6 (2009), available at 
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/Pattern_Jury_Instr/7th_civ_instruc_2009.pdf (obviousness). 
167. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, AIPLA’s MODEL PATENT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 7 (2008), available at http://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/ 
other-pubs/Documents/2008_03_27_AIPLA_Model_Jury_Instructions.doc (obviousness). 
168. NAT’L JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT, MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS §§ 1.4, 
1.5 (2009), available at http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.org/documents/ 
NationalPatentJuryInstructions.pdf (burden of proof — clear and convincing evidence and 
preponderance of the evidence). 
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ponderance of the evidence, which means more 
probable than not. However, clear and convincing 
evidence is lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard used in criminal cases.
The burden of proving obviousness is more easily 
satisfied when, as in this case, the prior art on which 
the claim of obviousness is based was not considered 
by the Examiner.169
Preponderance of the Evidence: 
A preponderance of the evidence is evidence that 
shows it is more probable than not that the patent 
was obvious. This is a lower standard of proof than 
either clear or convincing evidence or the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard used in criminal cases. 
After reviewing the jury instructions, the subjects were presented 
with several questions.170 First, we asked subjects for their ultimate 
decision on invalidity.171 For subjects who received the first two con-
ditions, we asked whether the patent challenger had proven by clear 
and convincing evidence that the patent was obvious. For subjects 
                                                                                                                  
169. Specifically, for this condition, the following sentence was added to the clear and 
convincing instruction: “The burden of proving obviousness is more easily satisfied when, 
as in this case, the prior art on which the claim of obviousness is based was not considered 
by the Examiner.” This sentence was adapted from Microsoft’s proposed instruction in 
another case, which would have instructed the jury that “the burden to prove invalidity ‘is 
more easily carried when the references on which the assertion [of invalidity] is based were 
not directly considered by the examiner during prosecution.’” Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari at 12, Microsoft Corp. v. z4 Techs., Inc., 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1243) 
(alteration in original). 
170. In the survey program (Qualtrics), respondents were not permitted to return to the 
fact pattern, summary of parties’ arguments, or jury instructions after they began answering 
questions. In real trials, jurors are frequently not provided written copies of the jury instruc-
tions for use in deliberations. Cf. United States v. Russo, 110 F.3d 948, 953 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(holding that “the decision whether to submit written instructions to the jury properly lies 
within the discretion of the trial court”). 
171. “The ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination” based on the reso-
lution of underlying factual issues. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) 
(citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1965)). In the authors’ experience, the 
ultimate decision on obviousness is routinely submitted to juries, although the court is em-
powered to evaluate “the [ultimate] legal conclusion [of obviousness] de novo” during post-
trial motions “to see whether it is correct in light of the presumed jury fact findings.” Kinet-
ic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1356–57 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (al-
teration in original) (quoting Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also John Guo, Note, Special Verdicts: An Obvious 
Trial Procedure for Deciding Obviousness in Patent Litigation, 40 SW. L. REV. 513, 515 
(2011) (“[T]he Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit reviews the question of obviousness 
‘de novo’, and it reviews the underlying jury’s factual findings to determine whether there is 
‘substantial evidence’ to support the jury’s findings.” (footnote omitted)). 
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who received the preponderance condition, we asked the same ques-
tion but substituted “preponderance of the evidence” for “clear and 
convincing.” Second, subjects were asked about their level of confi-
dence in their answer regarding invalidity on a 1–7 scale (1 = least 
confident, 7 = most confident). A third question asked the subjects to 
indicate “how likely do you think it is that Acme’s patent is obvious” 
on a 0–100% scale (in 10% increments). 
On the next page of the experiment, we included three validation 
questions designed to exclude subjects who had not read and/or ade-
quately understood the fact pattern.172 On the final page, the study 
concluded with several demographic questions about the subject’s 
age, race, gender, education, U.S. citizenship, patent experience, and 
golf experience. 
We ran a preliminary study to validate the language used. Ap-
proximately ten people read and completed the experiment. We dis-
cussed the experiment with these testers and made minor linguistic 
adjustments to improve comprehension. Subsequently, we conducted 
a pilot study on incoming first-year law students at Chicago-Kent Col-
lege of Law during orientation in August 2011.173 After the pilot 
study, we believed that the study was understandable to subjects. 
We conducted the experiment upon members of the general pub-
lic eligible for U.S. jury duty in November 2011 (N = 500).174 Sub-
jects were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,175 a website 
that allows participants to complete Human Intelligence Tasks for 
compensation. In the initial iteration, we compensated subjects $2 for 
successfully completing the experiment.176 Recent studies have used 
                                                                                                                  
172. Approximately 7% of subjects (35 of 535) were excluded from our results presented 
in Part V for incorrectly answering one or more validation questions. To avoid priming 
subjects to pay close attention to the standard of proof, the validation questions were di-
rected to basic information from the fact pattern. The questions did not relate to the standard 
of proof. 
During a workshop, a colleague suggested that real patent jurors sometimes do not pay 
attention at trial, and including subjects who failed the validation questions was appropriate 
to mirror the real juror population. While we believe that our approach is more methodolog-
ically sound, we note that including the responses of such subjects does not materially affect 
any of our results. 
173. In the pilot study, there was no statistically significant difference in outcomes based 
on the burden of proof (p = 0.826). The reason for the differences in results between the 
pilot and this study is unclear. It may be due to the relatively small sample size of the pilot 
study’s population (N = 150), which made it difficult to obtain a statistically significant 
result. It also could be due to demographic differences between first-year law students and 
members of the general public, although we do not have a well-formed hypothesis as to why 
this would be the case. 
174. Approval from the Illinois Institute of Technology’s (“IIT”) Internal Review Board 
(“IRB”), where both authors worked at the time of the experiments, was obtained prior to 
conducting all experiments. 
175. AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com (last visited May 9, 2013).
176. We decided to compensate participants $2 for completing the survey in the first iter-
ation because we anticipated that it would take approximately 20–30 minutes to complete. 
We received all 500 responses for the first iteration in less than 24 hours. For the second 
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Mechanical Turk to successfully replicate the results of well-known 
social science experiments, including the prisoner’s dilemma, provid-
ing evidence that subjects recruited through Mechanical Turk “behave 
similarly to subjects in physical laboratories.”177 Research using Me-
chanical Turk-based experiments has been published and presented in 
a number of academic fields, including peer-reviewed journals, which 
suggests that it meets scholarly expectations for quality web-based 
experiments.178
In an attempt to mirror jury-eligible persons, we limited the sub-
jects to those within the United States who were U.S. citizens,179 who 
understood English, and who were at least eighteen years old.180 Sub-
jects who wished to participate were redirected to the experiment, 
which was hosted by Qualtrics, a widely used online survey pro-
gram.181 On average, subjects spent seventeen minutes completing the 
                                                                                                                  
iteration, we reduced the compensation to $1 and received 600 responses in less than 48 
hours.
177. John J. Horton, David G. Rand & Richard J. Zeckhauser, The Online Laboratory: 
Conducting Experiments in a Real Labor Market, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 399, 406 
(2011); see also John Bohannon, Social Science for Pennies, 334 SCI. 307 (2011). 
178. See Adam J. Berinsky, Gregory A. Huber & Gabriel S. Lenz, Evaluating Online La-
bor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, 20 POL.
ANALYSIS 351, 354–61, 365–66 (2012) (assessing the internal and external validity of ex-
perimental research conducted using the Mechanical Turk platform, finding the  
“MTurk subject pool is no worse than convenience samples used by other researchers in 
political science”). Studies relying on Mechanical Turk to conduct experiments include 
Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character, Motive, and the Psychology of 
Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 274, 280, 285 (2012), and Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. 
Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1998, 
2004 (2010). Studies using other online recruiting methods include Yany Grégoire,  
Thomas M. Tripp & Renaud Legoux, When Customer Love Turns into Lasting Hate: The 
Effects of Relationship Strength and Time on Customer Revenge and Avoidance, 73 J.
MARKETING 18, 21 (2009) (recruiting participants from consumer complaint forums) and 
Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1334 (2011) (using 
Qualtrics to recruit participants). 
179. Mechanical Turk allows requestors to screen subjects by country of origin. We are 
grateful to Matthew Sag, our discussant at the 7th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal 
Studies (“CELS”), for checking the IP addresses for all 500 of our subjects to determine 
their countries of origin. We used Plot IP to further investigate the country of origin of 
questionable IP addresses that Sag identified. PLOT IP, http://www.plotip.com (last visited 
May 9, 2013). After analysis, we believe that 3.6% of subjects in our study (18 of 500) 
apparently accessed the survey from IP addresses from outside the United States, with one 
additional subject from each of the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. This is consistent 
with the literature regarding other experiments using Mechanical Turk. See David G. Rand, 
The Promise of Mechanical Turk: How Online Labor Markets Can Help Theorists Run 
Behavioral Experiments, 299 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 172, 176 (2012) (finding that Me-
chanical Turk users’ self-reported country of residence was over 97% accurate based on IP 
addresses). Excluding these non-U.S. subjects does not affect our results. 
180. Age and citizenship status were self-reported. 
181. QUALTRICS, http://www.qualtrics.com (last visited May 9, 2013); see also Victoria 
Barret, Qualtrics: Tech’s Hidden Gem in Utah, FORBES (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/victoriabarret/2012/05/15/qualtrics-techs-hidden-gem-in-utah 
(stating that Qualtrics users include “half the largest U.S. companies (Prudential, Geico and 
Microsoft among them), research arms of several federal agencies and 600 universities”). 
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experiment. The program prohibited subjects from submitting multi-
ple responses. 
Based on self-reported demographic information, the subjects of 
our online experiment were more female (61%), younger (61% be-
tween 18–34 years old, 38% between 35–64 years old), somewhat less 
racially and ethnically diverse (82% white, 7% African-American, 5% 
Hispanic, 4% Asian-American, 3% other), and better educated (48% 
had undergraduate degree or higher) than the general population.182
When compared to a sample of jurors in long-term federal trials (20+ 
days) in a study by the Federal Judicial Center,183 our experiment’s 
subjects were of similar diversity with respect to race and sex, but 
were better educated and younger.184 Notably, the subjects’ de-
mographics were more representative of the overall U.S. population 
than the law students used in our pilot study, as well as the under-
graduate students used in previous experimental studies regarding jury 
behavior that have been published in peer-reviewed psychology jour-
nals.185
V. DISCUSSION
This Part first discusses the results of our experiment. It then sets 
forth various implications from the experiment’s findings. Finally, it 
discusses several potential directions for future research regarding 
standards of proof. 
                                                                                                                  
182. The general population of the United States is 50.8% female, 13.1% African-
American, 16.7% Hispanic, 5.0% Asian-American, and 28.2% college graduates. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS (2013), available at 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last updated Mar. 14, 2013). 
183. JOE S. CECIL, E. ALLAN LIND & GORDON BERMANT, JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY
CIVIL TRIALS (1987), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/jurylnth.pdf/ 
$file/jurylnth.pdf. This study examined the demographic characteristics of jurors in twenty-
nine complex civil jury trials that lasted at least twenty days. Id. at 11. These trials were 
conducted in six different federal districts — the Central, Northern, and Southern Districts 
of California; the Northern District of Illinois; the Southern District of New York; and the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 12 tbl.1. 
One apparent limitation of the Federal Judicial Center study is that it is now rather dated; 
the trials studied in it were conducted between 1976 and 1979, id. at 11, and thus do not 
reflect the increased racial and ethnic diversity of the United States and the increased educa-
tion level of the jury-eligible population since the 1970s. However, more recent data on the 
demographics of federal jurors is not publicly available. We understand that while the fed-
eral district courts collect and maintain demographic information about their respective jury 
pools, they have a general policy against releasing this information. 
184. The jurors in the long-term trials studied by the Federal Judicial Center were  
57% female, 19% nonwhite, 22% college graduates, and had a mean age of 46.4 years.  
Id. at 19 tbl.4, 20. 
185. Cf. Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 87, at 162, 165 (using undergraduate psycholo-
gy students as research subjects); Kerr et al., supra note 86, at 285 (same). 
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A. Results 
In the experiment, the primary issue was whether the subjects’ in-
validity determinations varied based on the standard of proof and the 
presence or absence of an i4i-type jury instruction. First, we hypothe-
sized that the clear and convincing standard would result in fewer 
findings of invalidity than the preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard. Second, we hypothesized that the clear and convincing standard 
would result in fewer findings of invalidity than the same standard 
given with an i4i-type instruction. Finally, we predicted that the clear 
and convincing standard with an i4i-type instruction would have few-
er findings of invalidity than a plain preponderance standard. 
Figure 2: Invalidity Decisions by Standard of Proof 
As shown in Figure 2 above, there were significant differences in 
mock jurors’ decisions between the clear and convincing condition 
and the preponderance and i4i-type conditions.186 As expected, sub-
jects who received the clear and convincing standard found the patent 
invalid less often (27.1%) than those who received the preponderance 
standard (38.3%). Similarly, subjects who received the clear and con-
vincing standard found the patent invalid less often than those who 
received the clear and convincing standard with an i4i-type instruction 
(43.6%). In a counterintuitive result, however, subjects who received 
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the clear and convincing evidence standard with an i4i-type instruc-
tion found the patent invalid more often than those who received the 
preponderance standard (43.6% vs. 38.3%). 
Using Pearson’s chi-square ( 2) statistic, we compared each con-
dition against the other two to determine if the differences were statis-
tically significant.187 There was a highly statistically significant dif-
difference between the clear and convincing standard and the same 
standard given with an i4i-type instruction.188 There was also a statis-
tically significant difference in results between the clear and convinc-
ing standard and the preponderance standard.189 Thus, the invalidity 
decisions from a plain clear and convincing standard are noticeably 
different from invalidity decisions using either of the other two stand-
ards. Both of these results are consistent with our first two hypotheses. 
However, the difference between the clear and convincing stand-
ard with an i4i-type instruction and the preponderance standard was 
not found to be statistically significant.190 In other words, given the 
sample size, our experiment could not discern a difference between 
these two instructions. In its i4i decision, the Court apparently as-
sumed that the i4i-type instruction was distinguishable from a prepon-
derance of the evidence standard.191 But our experiment could not 
detect any difference in results between these two conditions. Thus, 
while the Supreme Court explicitly rejected Microsoft’s request to 
drop the standard to a preponderance of the evidence standard, the 
ruling by the Court may have effectively provided the same relief. 
We then used a series of fixed-effects, multiple logistic regression 
models to test if this result held after controlling for other independent 
variables that might potentially impact subjects’ decisions, including 
demographic characteristics (age, sex, and race), educational back-
ground, science degree, previous patent-related experience, and expe-
rience with golf, which is the subject matter of the patent in the 
                                                                                                                  
187. Statistical significance is the probability that an observed relationship is not due to 
chance. See Getting Started with Statistics Concepts, STATSOFT, http://www.statsoft.com/ 
textbook/elementary-statistics-concepts/_#What_is_"statistical_significance"_(p-level) (last 
visited May 9, 2013). A p-value of less than 0.05 is usually considered statistically signifi-
cant. LAWLESS, ROBBENNOLT & ULEN, supra note 145, at 233–34 (“When a result has less 
than a 5 percent chance of having been observed but is observed anyway, it is said to be 
statistically significant.”). A 5% probability is equal to a p-value of 0.05 or less. Results 
with a p-value of less than 0.01 are considered highly statistically significant. See id. at 234 
n.4 (explaining that a 1% chance “represents a ‘higher’ level of significance because it 
indicates a less probable outcome and hence a more rigorous statistical test”). All data anal-
ysis was conducted using Stata/IC. 
188. p = 0.002. 
189. p = 0.031. 
190. p = 0.322. 
191. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2251 (2011) (holding that a 
clear and convincing standard exists, even when the party challenging invalidity offers new 
evidence not considered by the USPTO). 
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experiment.192 The short answer is yes: the differences between the 
clear and convincing condition on the one hand, and both the prepon-
derance standard and the clear and convincing standard with an i4i-
type instruction were significant in the expected direction. More spe-
cifically, even after holding all these other variables constant, the pre-
ponderance standard correlated with an increase in the odds ratio.193
The best estimate is that there is a 90% increase in the odds ratio.194
The clear and convincing standard with an i4i-type instruction corre-
lated with an increase in the odds ratio. The best estimate is that the 
odds ratio increased by 128% for finding the patent invalid,195 com-
pared to the plain clear and convincing standard.196 Furthermore, even 
with all of these statistical controls, we were unable to discern a statis-
tically significant difference when comparing the preponderance 
standard to the clear and convincing standard with an i4i-type instruc-
tion. In other words, the difference in the odds ratio for invalidity be-
tween these conditions falls between-8% and 48%, which is within the 
standard error.197 The full results for these regressions are reported in 
Appendix B. 
In a separate question, we also asked subjects to separately indi-
cate the percent likelihood that the patent was obvious (from 0% like-
ly to be obvious to 100% likely to be obvious, in 10% increments). 
This variable served in part as a “check” on subjects’ answers regard-
ing the patent’s invalidity. For example, if a subject found the patent 
was 20% likely to be obvious, but separately answered that the patent 
                                                                                                                  
192. See infra Appendix B for a more detailed description of the coding for  
these variables. 
193. The odds ratio is defined as “the odds that an outcome will occur given a particular 
exposure, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the absence of that exposure.” 
Magdalena Szumilas, Explaining Odds Ratios, 19 J. CAN. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT
PSYCHIATRY 227, 227 (2010). 
194. It is 95% likely that the increase in the odds ratio is in the interval between 0.43 
(43% increase in the odds ratio) and 1.38 (138% increase in the odds ratio). Any range 
toward the middle of this interval is more likely to cover the true increase than is any range 
toward the interval’s extremes. In other words, a range of (0.89, 0.91) is more likely to 
cover the true increase than an interval of (0.43, 0.45) or an interval of (1.36, 1.38). 
195. It is 95% likely that the increase in the odds ratio is in the interval between 0.72 
(72% increase in the odds ratio) and 1.83 (183% increase in the odds ratio). 
196. As reported in Appendix B, we used three separate specifications for the regression, 
each with successively more control variables. All of the models supported the same overall 
findings. Above we report the results from model 3, the most complete of the models and 
the one with the best goodness of fit. Furthermore, if one were to correct using the most 
conservative multiple testing penalty (which requires a p-value of less than 0.167), the find-
ings from models 2 and 3 remain statistically significant. However, the difference in the 
base regression model 1 is not statistically significant if one were to make a multiple testing 
penalty. For a discussion of multiple testing errors, see generally John D. Storey, The Posi-
tive False Discovery Rate: A Bayesian Interpretation and the q-Value, 31 ANNALS OF STAT.
2013 (2003). 
197. The only other statistically significant variable was female subjects, which had a 
negative relationship with invalidity (i.e., men were more likely to find the patent invalid 
than women). 
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was in fact invalid (for any condition), then the subject likely misun-
derstood the burden of proof and/or made an error in one of the re-
sponses. The reason is that under all three standards of proof we test-
tested, the patent should only be declared invalid if the percentage 
obviousness is greater than 50%. We found that only 5% of responses 
(25 of 500) had conflicting answers regarding the percentage likeli-
hood of obviousness and their ultimate decision on validity,198 sug-
gesting that the vast majority of subjects understood and answered 
these two questions consistently.199
Next, using a logistic regression analysis, we tested whether there 
was a relationship between the percentage likelihood that the patent 
was obvious and the subject’s ultimate answer regarding the patent’s 
invalidity (for all three standards). Not surprisingly, the relationship 
between these two variables was found to be highly statistically sig-
nificant with a positive coefficient that was large in magnitude.200 We 
then analyzed the subjects’ level of confidence in their invalidity deci-
sions, which were recorded on a 1–7 scale (with 1 representing “not at 
all confident” and 7 representing “very confident”). More specifically, 
we investigated whether the subjects’ confidence in their decision 
regarding invalidity varied based on the standard of proof received. 
We thought it possible that subjects who believed the patent was inva-
lid might be more confident in their decision if confronted with a low-
er standard of proof (i.e., preponderance instead of clear and 
convincing evidence), while conversely, subjects who believed the 
patent was valid might be more confident in their decision if faced 
with a higher standard of proof for overcoming the presumption of 
validity.
This result, however, was more ambiguous. A simple regression 
analysis between confidence and condition based on subjects’ deci-
sion regarding invalidity revealed no statistically significant relation-
ship between these variables for either subjects who found the patent 
valid201 or subjects who found the patent invalid.202 The mean confi-
                                                                                                                  
198. We classified responses as “conflicting” in three situations: (1) when the percent 
obvious response was 100%, but the respondent found the patent valid (for any condition); 
(2) when the percent obvious response was 40% or less, but the respondent found the patent 
invalid (for any condition); and (3) for the preponderance condition only, when the percent 
obvious response was 60% or greater, but the respondent found the patent valid. 
199. For graphical illustrations of the relationship between subjects’ responses for per-
centage likelihood of obviousness and invalidity decisions for each condition, see Matthew 
Sag, My CELS Comments on “Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Experiment from 
Patent Law,” COPYRIGHT LAW, FAIR USE & TECH. (Nov. 10, 2012), http://matthewsag.com/ 
my-cels-comments-on-standards-of-proof-in-civil-litigation-an-experiment-from-patent-law.
200. p < 0.001;  = 0.8206972. The magnitude of the Beta coefficient ( ) represents the 
relative contribution of the independent variable in the prediction of the dependent variable; 
it is represented as a value between-1 (negative correlation) and 1 (positive correlation). See,
e.g., Statistics Glossary, STATSOFT, http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/statistics-
glossary/b/?button=0#Beta Coefficients (last visited May 9, 2013). 
201. p = 0.1873. 
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dence levels for each condition, sorted by ultimate decision on inva-
lidity, are reported in Table 1 below. 




Clear and Convincing 5.28 5.51 
Clear and Convincing w/ 
i4i-type instruction 5.44 5.37
Preponderance 5.46 5.36 
Table 1: Mean Confidence (1–7 Scale),  
by Condition and by Invalidity Decision 
However, subjects’ mean confidence levels were found to vary 
depending on their assessment of the likelihood that the patent would 
be found obvious. For all three conditions, this resulted in a U-shaped 
distribution, as subjects who thought the patent was either highly like-
ly or highly unlikely to be obvious were more confident in their re-
sponses than subjects who concluded the obviousness decision was a 
closer call. The latter group of subjects — i.e., those who recognized 
the obviousness decision reasonably might go either way — is argua-
bly more likely to be influenced by a change in the standard of proof. 
The mean confidence level by percentage of likelihood obviousness 
for all three conditions is depicted in Figure 3 below.203
                                                                                                                  
202. p = 0.4385. 
203. At a more granular level, this U-shaped distribution exists for each of the three con-
ditions studied: clear and convincing evidence, clear and convincing evidence with an i4i-
type instruction, and preponderance of the evidence. 
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Figure 3: Mean Confidence (1–7 Scale), 
by Percentage Likelihood of Obviousness (All Conditions) 
When we presented our preliminary results at a recent academic 
conference, several colleagues suggested that our results might have 
been driven by the precise wording used for the i4i-type instruction. 
To consider this objection, we conducted a second iteration of the 
experiment in March 2012 using members of the general public eligi-
ble for U.S. jury duty (N=603).204 The second iteration included the 
identical fact pattern and arguments section. However, the three ran-
domly assigned jury instructions were altered. We included verbatim 
the clear and convincing standard with the original i4i-type instruction 
designated above for one of the three randomly assigned jury instruc-
tions. To evaluate how much the precise wording of the i4i-type in-
struction mattered, the other two instructions were linguistic 
variations on the i4i-type instruction. In particular, the first variation 
removed the phrase “as in this case” from the final sentence of the 
original instruction,205 while the second variation206 replaced the final 
                                                                                                                  
204. For this iteration, we excluded subjects who had participated in the previous version 
of the experiment. This was accomplished by means of self-verification by subjects, as well 
as double-checking subjects’ user IDs in Mechanical Turk to determine if they had complet-
ed the first experiment. We compensated subjects $1 for successfully completing the second 
iteration of the experiment.
205. This variation stated: 
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that shows it is highly 
probable that the patent was obvious. This is a higher standard of 
proof than a preponderance of the evidence, which means more prob-
able than not. However, clear and convincing evidence is lower than 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in criminal cases. The 
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sentence of original instruction with the following two sentences: “In 
this case, the prior art on which the claim of obviousness is based was 
not considered by the Examiner. This may make it easier to satisfy the 
burden of proving obviousness.” The demographics of the subjects 
participating in the second iteration of the experiment were very simi-
lar to the original.207
The second iteration of the experiment confirmed our original 
findings. We found no statistically significant differences among the 
three variations of the clear and convincing standard with an i4i-type
jury instruction.208 We contend that these results (or more accurately 
the lack of a statistically significant result) blunt the objection that the 
specific wording of the instruction alone drove our results. 
                                                                                                                  
burden of proving obviousness is more easily satisfied when the prior 
art on which the claim of obviousness is based was not considered by 
the Examiner. 
206. This variation stated: 
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that shows it is highly 
probable that the patent was obvious. This is a higher standard of 
proof than a preponderance of the evidence, which means more prob-
able than not. However, clear and convincing evidence is lower than 
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in criminal cases. In this 
case, the prior art on which the claim of obviousness is based was not 
considered by the Examiner. This may make it easier to satisfy the 
burden of proving obviousness. 
207. Based on self-reported demographic information, subjects for the second online ex-
periment were more likely to be female (52%), younger (65% between 18–34 years old, 
34% between 35–64 years old), were somewhat more racially and ethnically diverse than 
the first online experiment (80% white, 6% African-American, 4% Hispanic, 6% Asian-
American, 3% other), and had roughly the same level of education as the first online exper-
iment (48% had an undergraduate degree or higher). 
208. Using Pearson’s chi-square ( 2) statistic, p = 0.647 for the clear and convincing 
standard with the original i4i-type instruction compared to the first tested variation, and p = 
0.195 for the clear and convincing standard with the original i4i-type instruction compared 
to the second tested variation. In this iteration, subjects who received the clear and convinc-
ing standard with the original i4i-type instruction found the patent invalid 32.8% of the 
time; subjects who received the first tested variation found the patent invalid 35.0% of the 
time; and subjects who received the second tested variation found the patent invalid 39.0% 
of the time. 
We do not believe it is methodologically sound to directly compare results between the 
two iterations of the study for several reasons. They were conducted slightly over four 
months apart. By definition, they were taken upon different populations of Mechanical Turk 
users. Because we understood a direct comparison to be problematic, we re-ran the clear and 
convincing standard with the original i4i-type instruction against the two different variations 
so that an apples-to-apples comparison could be made. However, should such a comparison 
be made, it would not alter the results in a meaningful way. Specifically, if the data for the 
original clear and convincing standard with the i4i-type instruction are combined from both 
experiments, subjects found the patent invalid 37.8% of the time (140 of 370), which is 
statistically indistinguishable from the subjects’ rate of invalidity findings under the prepon-
derance standard in the first experiment (38.3%, 62 of 162). 
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B. Implications 
Our experiment’s results suggest that standards of proof, and the 
jury instructions used to explain them, matter in civil litigation, alt-
hough sometimes in unpredictable ways.  
In patent challenges, our results suggest that if the Court in i4i
had switched from a clear and convincing standard of proof to a pre-
ponderance standard for invalidity challenges, as Microsoft advocat-
ed, it may have resulted, ceteris paribus, in more patents being found 
invalid by juries. A switch to a preponderance standard also might 
have significantly affected patent holders’ behavior, including bring-
ing to trial fewer lawsuits involving patents of questionable validi-
ty.209 Previous empirical studies have found that a sizeable fraction — 
in some studies over half — of patent cases that reach a merits deci-
sion regarding validity ultimately find one or more claims to be inva-
lid.210 If the Court had adopted a preponderance standard in i4i,
patentees may have been more reluctant to incur the time and expense 
of litigation in the face of higher odds that the patent(s)-in-suit would 
be found invalid if litigated to completion.211
Another notable implication is that the inclusion of an i4i-type in-
struction regarding evidence not previously considered by the USPTO 
may result in more invalidity findings. As noted above, we found a 
statistically significant difference between a plain clear and convinc-
ing standard and the same standard when given with an instruction of 
the type approved by the Court in i4i. Indeed, in our experiment, sub-
jects found patents invalid at rates indistinguishable from the prepon-
derance standard when such an i4i-type instruction was given. If this 
result extrapolates to patent litigation, the importance of i4i-type in-
structions may have been underappreciated by both courts and parties, 
as such an instruction may effectively reduce the standard of proof, 
even if it formally remains clear and convincing evidence. One possi-
ble explanation is that this may be partially due to a “framing effect,” 
where the additional sentence in the i4i-type instruction draws the 
jurors’ attention to the perceived lower standard for invalidity (i.e., 
                                                                                                                  
209. See Alsup, supra note 140, at 1650 (arguing that a shift to a preponderance standard 
would “deter at least some infringement actions based on weak patents”). 
210. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 196–205 (1998) (finding that in 46% of final patent 
validity decisions reported in the U.S. Patent Quarterly between 1989 and 1996, the patent 
was determined to be invalid); Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 147, at 706 (finding 
that the most litigated patents since 2000 were invalidated about 70% of the time); Risch, 
supra note 161, at 483 (finding that in a study of patents asserted by nonpracticing entities 
that 65% of cases with a decision on the merits “invalidat[ed] at least part of a patent”). 
211. However, the rise of contingency fee agreements in patent cases may partially coun-
terbalance this by reducing the risks associated with the large attorneys’ fees that are often 
incurred in patent litigation. See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Represen-
tation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335 (2012). 
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“easier to satisfy”).212 As a result, patent infringement defendants 
should push for the inclusion of such an instruction at trial, as it may 
materially increase their odds of prevailing on this issue. 
Relatedly, our findings give patentees an additional incentive to 
submit all potentially relevant prior art to the USPTO, during initial 
prosecution, reexamination, or supplemental examination,213 to avoid 
the impact of an i4i-type instruction. If the patent examiner considers 
the submitted prior art — for instance, by citing to an issued patent, a 
published patent application, or a printed publication214 — then an i4i-
type instruction would be inappropriate. As noted in an amicus brief 
filed by past USPTO Commissioners and Directors in the i4i case, this 
would “encourage applicants to flood the USPTO with prior art,” with 
the potential effect of “strain[ing] the resources of the USPTO.”215
In contrast, in situations where it is clear the prior art was in fact 
considered by the examiner during prosecution, parties challenging a 
patent’s validity may be better served by attempting to invalidate the 
patent through administrative proceedings at the USPTO, which have 
a lower burden of proof compared to litigation. Our experiment found 
a large and statistically significant difference between the clear and 
convincing standard and the preponderance standard, with the latter 
generating an approximately 90% increase in invalidity findings.216
As a result, parties seeking to invalidate a patent in this situation like-
ly should elect to take advantage of the preponderance standard ap-
plied in reexamination proceedings217 and the new post-grant review 
proceeding provided for in the recently passed America Invents 
Act.218
                                                                                                                  
212. For an explanation of framing effects, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 
Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984), and Amos Tversky & 
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453 
(1981).
213. Section 12 of the recently passed Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. 
L. No. 112-29, § 257, 125 Stat. 284, 325 (2011), provides that the patentee may file a “Re-
quest for Supplemental Examination” asking the USPTO “to consider, reconsider, or correct 
information believed to be relevant to the patent.” See 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2006 & Supp. V 
2012).
214. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(d) (2013) (explaining the citation of references). 
215. Amici Curiae Brief of Former USPTO Commissioners and Directors in Support of 
Respondents at 29–30, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (No. 10-
290).
216. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
217. See In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that “[i]n 
[US]PTO examinations and reexaminations, the standard of proof — a preponderance of 
evidence — is substantially lower than in a civil case” and that “there is no presumption of 
validity”). Similarly, for the new inter partes review procedure in the AIA, a preponderance 
standard will apply. See AIA, § 6(a) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2006 & Supp. V 
2012)) (“In an inter partes review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner shall have the 
burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
218. See AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(d) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 326(e) (2006 & Supp. 
V 2012)) (“In a post-grant review instituted under this chapter, the petitioner shall have the 
burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
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Furthermore, because most patent cases do not reach trial, the i4i-
type instruction may be most strongly felt in summary judgment rul-
ings. In theory, the standard of proof is included within the summary 
judgment standard.219 We suspect that judges, using their intuition, 
may view the i4i-type instruction much like the Supreme Court appar-
ently did — as creating a standard of proof somewhere between a 
preponderance and pure clear and convincing evidence standard. Our 
data suggests, however, that jurors do not view it in the same way. 
Instead, jurors treat the i4i-type standard as indistinguishable from the 
preponderance standard. Thus, there may be a disconnect between 
judges’ and jurors’ views on the relevant standard of proof. This dis-
connect may result in judges denying patent challengers’ motion for 
summary judgment of invalidity in cases where reasonable jurors 
would find the patent claims invalid. If these cases proceeded to trial, 
the jurors would likely still find the patent invalid, and the effects of 
the disconnect would be small — primarily the additional cost of liti-
gating the invalidity defense. However, many cases settle before trial 
if summary judgment is denied. These cases likely would settle for 
higher amounts based upon the disconnect between judges’ and ju-
rors’ views on the relevant standard of proof. 
In addition, our results may have broader implications for stand-
ards of proof in civil litigation more generally. As previously dis-
cussed, some of the previous literature found that standards of proof 
matter in jurors’ decision making, although there were no representa-
tive studies that directly compared the clear and convincing standard 
with the preponderance standard.220 Our experiment suggests that ju-
rors are sensitive to these two standards of proof and may reach dif-
ferent decisions accordingly.221 This sensitivity to the standard of 
proof also tends to undermine previous criticisms that jurors in patent 
cases are unsophisticated and too easily swayed by tangential is-
sues,222 or overly impressed with “the fact that the patent was re-
viewed by an ‘expert agency’ with technically trained examiners.”223
                                                                                                                  
219. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (holding that “a rul-
ing on a motion for summary judgment . . . necessarily implicates the substantive eviden-
tiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits”). 
220. See supra Part II.C. 
221. Our results may also suggest that jurors have difficulty distinguishing between in-
creasingly fine variations of the standard of proof, as evidenced by the fact that the “inter-
mediate” clear and convincing with an i4i-type instruction resulted in invalidity findings 
comparable to the preponderance standard. For example, Kevin Clermont has argued that 
due to cognitive limitations, jurors measure uncertainty by referring to a “coarsely graded 
scale of probabilities” based on their own experiences, and thus legislators and other policy-
makers should avoid adopting “unrealistically finer degrees” of proof. Kevin M. Clermont, 
Procedure’s Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1144–47 (1987). 
222. See Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-
Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623, 624 (1996). 
223. See Moore, Black Box, supra note 147, at 373. 
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Furthermore, our experiment’s results regarding the i4i-type in-
struction suggest that instructions that tell the jury to consider or give 
weight to particular facts may have a substantial impact on jurors’ 
decisions. For example, some pattern jury instructions inform jurors 
that they may consider whether a witness (including an expert wit-
ness) has a bias, motive, or interest, including a financial interest, 
which might lead it to favor one of the parties, in determining whether 
to accept and what weight to give to that witness’ testimony.224 An-
other example is a jury instruction regarding spoliation, which is the 
destruction of, or failure to preserve, evidence that is relevant to actual 
or threatened litigation.225 As a remedy for spoliation, numerous cases 
have authorized an instruction informing the jury that it may infer that 
the destroyed evidence would have been unfavorable or harmful to the 
destroying party.226 Our results suggest that individual jurors may be 
particularly sensitive to these types of instructions. 
C. Directions for Future Research 
We believe that our study has presented interesting results — that 
both the standard of proof and the existence of an i4i-type instruction 
apparently matter to jurors in patent challenges — and that our results 
are worthy of further empirical investigation. Our research could be 
extended in additional directions that we outline below.227
                                                                                                                  
224. See, e.g., COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, FIFTH CIRCUIT DISTRICT
JUDGES ASS’N, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: FIFTH CIRCUIT, CIVIL CASES § 2.19 (2009) 
(permitting the following instruction for expert witnesses: “In deciding whether to accept or 
rely upon the opinion of an expert witness, you may consider any bias of the witness, in-
cluding any bias you may infer from evidence that the expert witness has been or will be 
paid for reviewing the case and testifying . . . .”). 
225. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, The Preservation Obligation: Regulating and Sanc-
tioning Pre-Litigation Spoliation in Federal Court, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 2018 
(2011).
226. See, e.g., Nucor Corp. v. Bell, 251 F.R.D. 191, 204 (D.S.C. 2008) (authorizing the 
following spoliation instruction: “If you find that defendants engaged in the spoliation of 
evidence, you are permitted, but not required, to infer that the altered or destroyed evidence 
would have been unfavorable to defendants. Any inference you decide to draw should be 
based on all the facts and circumstances in this case.”). 
227. Extensions to our research can aid in overcoming certain known objections to our 
experiment. There is an extensive literature about the limitations on mock jury research. See
generally Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, Methodological Considerations in the Study 
of the Psychology of the Courtroom, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 287 (Robert 
M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr eds., 1982); James H. Davis, Robert M. Bray & Robert W. Holt, 
The Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries: A Critical Review, in LAW, JUSTICE
AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 326 (June Louin 
Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977); Ronald C. Dillehay & Michael T. Nietzel, Construct-
ing a Science of Jury Behavior, in 1 REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
246 (Ladd Wheeler ed., 1980); Vladimir J. Konecni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, Methodological
Issues in Research on Legal Decision-Making, with Special Reference to Experimental 
Simulations, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 413 (Friedrich 
Losel, Doris Bender & Thomas Bliesener eds., 1992); Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological 
Validity of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999); 
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First, other researchers could attempt to replicate the results of 
our experiment using a different fact pattern. No individual study is 
dispositive of a research question, and additional experiments could 
help clarify if the results in our experiment reflect the variable being 
manipulated (here, the standard of proof), random chance, or some 
other unaccounted for factor.228 For instance, another experiment 
could use a fact pattern that is less likely to result in a 50-50 split in 
invalidity findings to determine if the standard of proof matters in 
such cases. And if replicated, one could also attempt to tease out how 
subjects understood the i4i-type instruction through, for example, an 
open-ended question about the standard of proof. 
One concern of all mock jury experiments — ours included — is 
ecological validity. Ecological validity refers to the degree our exper-
iment approximates the look, feel, and procedures of real trials, the 
situation we are studying.229 External validity is closely related to eco-
logical validity, and refers to the degree the experimental result can be 
generalized to real trials.230 While the external validity of mock jury 
research is widely accepted,231 there are obvious issues with ecologi-
cal validity in such research, including ours.232 For instance, in con-
                                                                                                                  
Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of Consequentiality 
in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443 (2005); Robert M. Bray & Norbert 
L. Kerr, Use of the Simulation Method in the Study of Jury Behavior: Some Methodological 
Considerations, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107 (1979); Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations
and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561 (1997); Kathleen 
Carrese Gerbasi, Miron Zuckerman & Harry T. Reis, Justice Needs a New Blindfold: A 
Review of Mock Jury Research, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 323 (1977); Robert J. MacCoun, Ex-
perimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCI. 1046 (1989), reprinted in 30 
JURIMETRICS 223 (1990); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How 
Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1997); Wayne Weiten & 
Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of 
Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1979). 
228. See LAWLESS, ROBBENNOLT & ULEN, supra note 145, at 47 (“[N]o individual study 
will be dispositive of a given research question. It is important that research results be repli-
cated.”); David S. Goldman, Legal Construct Validation: Expanding Empirical Legal 
Scholarship to Unobservable Concepts, 36 CAP. U. L. REV. 79, 121–22 (2007) (“[I]t cannot 
be determined from the single experiment alone if the results are a reflection of the variables 
being manipulated, random happenstance, or a third unaccounted for factor.”). 
229. See David L. Breau & Brian Brook, “Mock” Mock Juries: A Field Experiment on 
the Ecological Validity of Jury Simulations, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 77, 78 (2007) (“The 
question of ecological validity asks whether a simulation is conducted under conditions that 
are similar to those in the real world such that the results from the simulation are general-
izable to the world . . . . ”).
230. See LAWLESS, ROBBENNOLT & ULEN, supra note 145, at 39 (“The ecological validi-
ty . . . of a study . . . is sometimes used as a proxy for external validity. However, a study 
can have high external validity and be useful in legal or policy contexts even when it is not 
perfectly reflective of the conditions of that legal or policy setting.”). 
231. See supra note 227. 
232. But see Norbert L. Kerr & Robert J. MacCoun, Is the Leniency Asymmetry Really 
Dead? Misinterpreting Asymmetry Effects in Criminal Jury Deliberation, 15 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 585, 598 (2012) (arguing that mock jury experiments are 
not inferior to actual field experiments on jury behavior because “the latter are scarce and 
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trast to a full-blown trial, our experiment utilized a short, written de-
scription to convey the relevant facts and the parties’ arguments. This 
was necessary to entice a large number of subjects to participate in the 
study. But real patent trials are obviously more complicated. The ju-
rors hear live testimony from witnesses and review exhibits over an 
extended period of time, frequently one or two weeks. Opening and 
closing arguments at trials are delivered live, usually by experienced 
advocates. And most patent trials involve disputes over infringement, 
invalidity (often on several grounds), and damages, among other is-
sues. Finally, jury instructions in patent cases can include many pages 
of instructions,233 which may dilute the importance of any single in-
struction. To address these concerns, future experiments could replace 
the written fact pattern with recorded video clips of closing arguments 
by patent litigation attorneys and with jury instructions by a judge in 
order to make the experiment seem more realistic. The addition of a 
judge reading the instructions may also encourage subjects to consider 
more carefully the jury instructions.  
Another, perhaps more significant, external validity concern is the 
absence of deliberation. In real trials, jurors meet behind closed doors 
and discuss the charges, evidence, parties’ arguments, and instruc-
tions. Their eventual decision is informed not only by the evidence 
and other aspects of the trial, but by discussions with other jurors.234
Deliberation may help diffuse jury confusion that may exist before-
hand.235 As a result, our study is more reflective of the initial views of 
jurors before they begin the jury deliberation process, rather than a 
post-deliberation verdict. We cannot quantify what effect, if any, de-
liberation would have upon our results. However, negotiation theory 
suggests that higher opening offers in a negotiation should result in a 
                                                                                                                  
difficult to conduct, they rarely permit unconfounded experimental manipulations, and they 
usually lack the statistical power of mock jury experiments”). 
233. For example, the jury instructions given by the trial court judge in i4i Ltd. Partner-
ship v. Microsoft Corp. were 35 pages long and addressed numerous issues, including in-
fringement, willfulness, anticipation, obviousness, and damages, as well as the court’s claim 
construction. Court’s Charge, i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., No. 6:07CV113 (E.D. Tex. 
May 19, 2009), available at http://www.i4ilp.com/court/Jury%20Instructions.pdf. 
234. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, The Burden of Social Proof: Shared Thresholds and 
Social Influence, 119 PSYCHOL. REV. 345, 353 (2012) (explaining “the deliberation
paradigm, in which proponents of multiple viewpoints interact and attempt to  
influence each other”). 
235. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of 
Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV.
1537, 1595 (2012) (“One possibility is that jurors faced with applying instructions during 
deliberations are able to assist one another in ways not captured . . . in studies of individual 
respondents.”). But see Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 218–23 (1989) (finding that 49% of juror responses to researchers’ 
legal questions were unclear or wrong, and that deliberation did not cure individual jurors’ 
misunderstanding).
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higher final deal.236 Using the same logic, if the average juror is ini-
tially more inclined to find the patent invalid, then we suspect that the 
final verdict will likely be similarly more inclined. Future research 
could address this — albeit at the cost of significant time and ex-
pense — by adding group deliberations into the experiment.  
For those who believe that ecological validity issues limit draw-
ing inferences about real patent trials, we offer a more modest, alter-
native implication of our study. Sophisticated lawyers and clients 
frequently conduct mock jury studies as patent cases approach trial. 
These experienced players pay tens of thousands of dollars for such 
research,237 and we believe this supports external validity of the stud-
ies. However, even if mock jury studies such as ours are not repre-
sentative of real jury trials, litigants can use the results of these studies 
for many purposes, including formulating settlement positions. Thus, 
even if the studies themselves are not indicative of how actual juries 
would decide cases, the results of the flawed studies are incorporated 
into the parties’ settlement positions. Consequently, even if our results 
are not viewed as simulating actual trial results, they reveal valuable 
information about the likely results of settlements based upon mock 
jury studies. 
Finally, there is a possibility that the i4i-type instruction may 
have “demand effects” on subjects. A “demand effect” exists when 
subjects in an experiment change their behavior based on what they 
perceive to be the desired or anticipated outcome by the experiment’s 
organizers.238 It is conceivable that the i4i-type instruction being test-
ed could create a demand effect by suggesting to some subjects that 
they should find the patent invalid. However, we do not think a sub-
stantial demand effect is likely here. Based on discussions with people 
who participated in the preliminary study, it was not apparent to them 
that we were testing the standard of proof, so they could not alter their 
behavior to conform to any expected outcome. In addition, demand 
effects are more likely to occur in a within-subjects design — that is, 
when the same subject is exposed to multiple conditions in the exper-
                                                                                                                  
236. See Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Ne-
gotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 49 (1985) (“A negotiator who utilizes the competitive strate-
gy begins with a high initial demand. Empirical research repeatedly demonstrates a 
significant positive relationship between a negotiator’s original demand and his payoff.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
237. See, e.g., Tom Duffy, Online Mock Juries Coming of Age, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA,
Aug. 30, 2004 (noting that traditional mock jury studies can cost $20,000 to $30,000), 
http://www.ejury.com/pr/lawyersweekly.html. 
238. See Rachel Croson, Why and How to Experiment: Methodologies from Experimental 
Economics, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 921, 940 (2002) (“A demand effect is when a subject acts 
in a particular way to please the experimenter.”); see also Daniel J. Zizzo, Experimenter
Demand Effects in Economic Experiments, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 75 (2010). 
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iment — rather than the between-subjects design used here.239 Finally, 
demand effects may also occur in real patent trials, with jurors per-
ceiving an i4i-type instruction as a suggestion from the presiding 
judge that the patent is invalid. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Our experiment has shown that standards of proof may play a 
significant role in jurors’ decision making in civil litigation. Specifi-
cally, our results suggest that jurors apply standards of proof in liti-
gated patent challenges in the manner expected by theory — i.e., that 
a patent’s presumption of validity is more easily overcome under a 
preponderance of the evidence standard as compared to a plain clear 
and convincing evidence standard. Our experiments’ results also sug-
gest that jury instructions that highlight particular facts or argu-
ments — here, that evidence not previously considered by the USPTO 
can make it “easier to satisfy” the standard for proving a patent inva-
lid — can substantially influence jurors’ decisions. Indeed, by giving 
the type of jury instruction authorized in i4i, jurors may be effectively 
applying a standard of proof that is more similar to the preponderance 
standard rejected by the Court in that case, rather than the clear and 
convincing evidence standard.
                                                                                                                  
239. See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute 
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 70 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 
2002) (“The message that the [within-subjects] design conveys to the participants is that the 
experimenter expects to find effects of every factor that is manipulated . . . .”); Prentice, 
supra note 159, at 1680 (“Within-subjects tests, for example, often suffer from demand 
effects, where features of the experiment itself allow the subjects to surmise the goals of the 
experimenter, an occurrence that results in the skewing of the subjects’ responses.”). 
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF THE DISPUTE
This dispute is between Acme Golf, Inc. (“Acme”) and Bravo 
Sporting Equipment Co. (“Bravo”). Acme and Bravo are the two larg-
est manufacturers of golf balls in the United States. 
Historically, golf balls consisted of two parts, a solid core and a 
cover layer covered with dimples (indents). Some golf balls were de-
signed to travel long distances when struck by a club. These balls had 
a relatively hard plastic cover layer. However, this hard cover was 
relatively inflexible and created an undesirable “feel” when struck 
with a golf club. In addition, the hard cover made it difficult for some 
golfers to control the ball’s direction and/or spin. 
In contrast, other golf balls were designed to exhibit other desira-
ble characteristics, such as control for shorter shots and the proper 
“feel” when struck. These golf balls also have two parts (a solid core 
and a cover layer), but use a softer plastic material for the cover layer. 
One well-known and widely-used material for soft-cover golf balls 
was a type of plastic called polyurethane. But soft-cover balls had the 
disadvantage of travelling less distance than their hard-cover counter-
parts. In addition, soft-cover balls were less durable and tended to 
damage more easily. Both hard-cover and soft-cover balls were well 
known in the field since at least the 1950s. 
In 2005, a golf ball designer at Acme designed a three-piece golf 
ball consisting of the following parts: (1) a solid core, (2) a hard inner 
layer, and (3) a softer outer (cover) layer of polyurethane covered 
with dimples. This three-piece design resulted in a “dual personality” 
ball capable of traveling long distances due to the hard inner layer, but 
also had the desirable control and “feel” characteristics of soft-cover 
balls due to the polyurethane cover layer. Acme timely applied for a 
patent on this three-piece golf ball.
In the United States, patents are granted by the USPTO, which is 
an agency of the federal government. To obtain a patent, one must 
first file an application with the USPTO. The USPTO employs trained 
Patent Examiners who review patent applications. After an application 
is filed, an Examiner reviews it to determine whether or not the 
claimed invention is patentable. During this process, the Examiner 
searches for and reviews certain information about the state of tech-
nology in the relevant field(s) at the time the application was filed. 
This information is called “prior art.” In general, prior art includes all 
publicly-available information about the state of technology when the 
patent application was filed. The Examiner reviews this prior art to 
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determine whether the claimed invention is truly an advance over ex-
isting technology.
One requirement for obtaining a patent is that the invention would 
not have been obvious in light of the prior art. A claimed invention is 
obvious if an ordinary skilled person in the relevant field of technolo-
gy who knew about all of the prior art would have been able to come 
up with the invention at that time. 
In this case, the Examiner reviewed the prior art regarding both 
hard-cover and soft-cover golf balls and determined that Acme’s pa-
tent application for its three-piece golf ball was not obvious and there-
fore should receive a patent (the “Acme patent”). However, during 
examination, the Examiner did not locate and consequently did not 
review a patent granted to an inventor named Charles in 2000. The 
Charles patent disclosed a three-piece golf ball with a solid core, a 
hard inner layer, and an outer (cover) layer consisting of a very hard 
resin covered with dimples. This hard resin surface had the advantage 
of making the golf ball extremely durable. The Charles patent does 
not mention polyurethane, nor does it suggest trying to use a softer 
material for the outer (cover) layer of the ball. The parties agree the 
Charles patent is prior art to the Acme patent. 
Earlier this year, Bravo started selling “Flight X” golf balls that 
have a three-piece design with a solid core, a hard inner layer, and a 
softer outer (cover) layer of polyurethane. Acme believes that Bravo’s 
“Flight X” balls infringe Acme’s patent and has sued Bravo in court. 
In response, Bravo has asserted that Acme’s patent was obvious in 
light of the prior art (existing technology) at the time of Acme’s 
claimed invention. Under the patent law, if the invention in a patent 
was obvious, there is no liability for infringement. 
BRAVO’S ARGUMENT REGARDING OBVIOUSNESS
Bravo argues Acme’s patent is obvious because it merely com-
bines preexisting items that were already known in the prior art. Spe-
cifically, Bravo claims that the Charles patent disclosed a three-piece 
golf ball with inner and outer layers of different hardness. It would 
have been obvious to an ordinary golf ball manufacturer, Bravo con-
tends, to modify the Charles three-piece ball to have a soft outer (cov-
er) layer of polyurethane, which has been widely used in traditional 
two-piece soft-cover balls. Because of this polyurethane cover, a golf 
ball maker would expect such a ball to have the desirable control and 
“feel” characteristics of soft-cover balls. In addition, Bravo argues 
that the jury should not defer to the Patent Examiner’s conclusion that 
the Acme three-piece ball was patentable because the Examiner never 
considered the Charles patent, which is a key piece of prior art. The 
Examiner’s failure to consider the Charles patent satisfies Bravo’s 
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burden of proving that the claimed invention in Acme’s patent is ob-
vious because if the Examiner had known about the highly relevant 
Charles patent, then Acme would not have been granted a patent.  
ACME’S ARGUMENT REGARDING OBVIOUSNESS
Acme argues that its patent is not obvious for several reasons. 
First, none of the prior art disclosed the combination of items that re-
sulted in the patented invention. This combination is worthy of a pa-
tent, Acme contends, because it created a golf ball with the unique 
benefits of the control and “feel” of a two-piece soft-cover ball, com-
bined with the long distance of a hard-cover ball. Nothing in the prior 
art suggested this combination would create a ball with these favora-
ble characteristics. Second, the Charles patent does not make Acme’s 
patented invention obvious because the golf balls in the Charles patent 
were designed to solve a very different problem — the lack of dura-
bility. Third, Acme claims that the Charles patent does not make Ac-
me’s patented invention obvious because there is nothing in the 
Charles patent that would suggest or hint to an ordinary golf ball 
manufacturer that trying a softer cover like polyurethane on a three-
piece ball might be a good idea. Finally, Acme contends that the jury 
should defer to the decision of the trained Patent Examiner, who was 
in the best position to determine whether Acme’s claimed invention 
was obvious. As a result, Bravo cannot satisfy its burden of establish-
ing that Acme’s patent was obvious. 
INSTRUCTIONS‡
Below are the rules that you must follow in deciding whether 
Acme’s patent was obvious. 
The fact that the USPTO grants a patent on a claimed invention 
does not necessarily mean that it in fact deserves protection under the 
patent laws. A party can argue in court that it is not liable for in-
fringement because the patented invention was obvious. Here, Bravo 
is arguing that the Patent Examiner made an error in determining that 
the Acme patent was not obvious. 
Under the law, Acme’s patent is presumed to be not obvious. As a 
result, Bravo has the obligation to persuade you, which is called the 
burden of proof, that the claimed invention in [the]‡‡ Acme patent is 
obvious. An invention is obvious if a person of ordinary skill in the 
relevant field who knew about all of the prior art that existed at the 
time of the claimed invention would have come up with the invention 
at that time.  
                                                                                                                  
‡ Bracketed language in the instructions was varied by condition. 
‡‡ This word was inadvertently omitted from the original survey. 
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i[To succeed on its claim, Bravo must prove obviousness by clear 
and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence 
that shows it is highly probable that the patent was obvious. This is a 
higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence, which 
means more probable than not. However, clear and convincing evi-
dence is lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in 
criminal cases.]  
ii[To succeed on its claim, Bravo must prove obviousness by clear 
and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence 
that shows it is highly probable that the patent was obvious. This is a 
higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence, which 
means more probable than not. However, clear and convincing evi-
dence is lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in 
criminal cases. The burden of proving obviousness is more easily sat-
isfied when, as in this case, the prior art on which the claim of obvi-
ousness is based was not considered by the Examiner.]  
iii[To succeed on its claim, Bravo must prove obviousness by a 
preponderance of the evidence. A preponderance of the evidence is 
evidence that shows it is more probable than not that the patent was 
obvious. This is a lower standard of proof than either clear or convinc-
ing evidence or the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in crimi-
nal cases.]
iv[To succeed on its claim, Bravo must prove obviousness by 
clear and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is evi-
dence that shows it is highly probable that the patent was obvious. 
This is a higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evi-
dence, which means more probable than not. However, clear and con-
vincing evidence is lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard used in criminal cases. The burden of proving obviousness is 
more easily satisfied when the prior art on which the claim of obvi-
ousness is based was not considered by the Examiner.] 
v[To succeed on its claim, Bravo must prove obviousness by clear 
and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence is evidence 
that shows it is highly probable that the patent was obvious. This is a 
                                                                                                                  
i. This language was only given to subjects who received the clear and convincing evi-
dence condition in the first iteration of the experiment. 
ii. This language was given to subjects who received the clear and convincing evidence 
with the i4i-type instruction in both the first and second iterations of the experiment. In the 
first iteration of this experiment, there was a blank line before the last sentence of this para-
graph.
iii. This language was only given to subjects who received the preponderance of the evi-
dence condition in the first iteration of the experiment. 
iv. This language was only given to subjects who received the first variation of the clear 
and convincing condition with the i4i-type instruction condition in the second iteration of 
the experiment. 
v. This language was only given to subjects who received the second variation of the 
clear and convincing condition with the i4i-type instruction condition in the second iteration 
of the experiment.
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higher standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence, which 
means more probable than not. However, clear and convincing evi-
dence is lower than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in 
criminal cases. This may make it easier to satisfy the burden of prov-
ing obviousness.] 
In deciding obviousness, you should put yourself in the position 
of a person with ordinary skill in the relevant field of technology at 
the time of the claimed invention. You must not use hindsight; in oth-
er words, you may not consider what is known now or what was 
learned from Acme’s patent to determine whether it is obvious. In 
addition, you may not use Acme’s patent as a roadmap for selecting 
and combining items of prior art to create the claimed invention. 
QUESTIONS
Based on the information provided above, please answer the fol-
lowing questions.
1. Did Bravo prove by [clear and convincing evidence / a prepon-
derance of the evidence]‡ that Acme’s patent was obvious? 
_________    ___________ 
Yes                  No    
   (Obvious)    (Not Obvious)  
2. On a scale of 1 to 7, how confident are you in your answer to 
Question #1?
     1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
Not at all                                  Moderately                              Extremely 
confident                                 confident                                  confident 
3. On a scale of 0% to 100%, how likely do you think it is that 
Acme’s patent was obvious? 
0%   10%   20%   30%   40%   50%   60%   70%   80%   90%   100% 
Certainly                                        Equally                              Certainly 
not obvious                                     likely                                  obvious 
                                                         to be 
                                                       obvious 
                                                        or not 
                                                       obvious 
                                                                                                                  
‡ Bracketed language in the question was varied based on condition. 
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APPENDIX B
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Race indicator  X X 
Golf  
experience
















R2 .0285 .0433 .0496 
Table 2: Logistic Regression Model for Clear and Convincing Evi-
dence with i4i-type Instruction and Preponderance of the Evidence‡
                                                                                                                  
‡ The tables in Appendix B report three separate logistic regression models that predict 
obvious, a variable that is positive when a respondent indicated that the patent is invalid as 
obvious. Preponderance jury instruction refers to the preponderance of the evidence in-
struction; i4i jury instruction refers to the clear and convincing evidence with i4i-type in-
struction; female is a dummy variable for whether the respondent was female. In addition, 
models 2 and 3 include dummy variables for age (including separate dummy variables for 
ages between 18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65 years or older), education (in-
cluding separate dummy variables for high school degree or less, some college, 4-year col-
lege degree, and advanced degree), and race (separate dummy variables for White, Black, 
Hispanic, Asian-American/Pacific Islander, Native American, and Other). Model 3 includes 
dummy variables golf (which is positive if the respondent indicated they were somewhat 
knowledgeable or highly knowledgeable about golf), patent (personal experience with the 
patent system), and science (college degree or advanced degree in a scientific field). The 
values reported are odds ratios and (standard errors). Superscripts report the relevant level 
of statistical significance: variables which do not significantly predict the response variables 
(no superscript), while others are predictors at a marginal level of significance (†), p  0.1; 
at the conventional definition of significance (*), p  0.05; at higher level of significance 
(**), p  0.01; and at an even higher level of significance (***), p  0.001. The models were 
created using Stata. 
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R2 .0285 .0433 .0496 
Table 3: Logistic Regression Model for Clear and Convincing Evi-
dence and Clear and Convincing Evidence with i4i-Type Instruction 
